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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consumer protection laws provide state attorneys general (AGs) with 
sweeping authority to address improper business practices.  As their 
name suggests, most state Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices 
(UDAP) laws1 broadly prohibit any conduct that can be viewed as 
“unfair” or “deceptive.”2  The open-ended nature of these terms provides 
substantial power to state AGs.  In most cases, state AGs and their staffs 
quietly, responsibly, and effectively apply this broad authority to protect 
the rights of consumers.  In recent years, however, there is growing 
concern among businesses, courts, and commentators that some UDAP 
actions have strayed from their intended purpose of protecting 
consumers.  The types of enforcement actions that have raised 
controversy bear little resemblance to traditional government 
enforcement of consumer protection laws. 
This Article identifies four common elements in the types of UDAP 
actions that have raised concern.  First, these cases are typically not 
sparked by consumer complaints, but are developed by private lawyers 
retained by AGs to pursue the litigation on the state’s behalf.  Second, 
the cases often target practices already regulated by government agencies 
charged with protecting the public.  AGs have, for example, used UDAP 
laws to step into the shoes of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to 
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 1.   These laws are also frequently referred to as Consumer Protection Acts (CPA) or Unfair or 
Deceptive Trade Practices Acts (UDTPA). 
 2.   See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-104 (West 2002) (“Unfair methods of competition 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared 
unlawful.”). 
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regulate the marketing of prescription drugs or impose fines that are not 
warranted under federal law.  Third, these enforcement actions routinely 
seek the maximum civil penalty authorized by law, then aggregate that 
amount “per violation,” multiplying it for each letter mailed, sales call 
made, prescription filled, or product or service sold.  Calculating civil 
penalties in this manner may lead to fines that are disproportionate to the 
alleged misconduct or consumer loss.  Finally, rather than provide a 
benefit to consumers, some AGs have distributed funds from the 
resulting settlements and judgments to outside organizations and 
politically popular projects with no more than an attenuated relationship 
to the lawsuits. 
While these types of UDAP actions remain the exception, rather than 
the rule, they are becoming more common.  They pose a threat to good 
government, sound public policy, and due process.  To address excesses 
in UDAP enforcement actions, this Article offers recommendations for 
consideration of courts and policymakers.3  These proposals would 
preserve an AG’s ability to quickly stop deceptive practices, obtain 
restitution for any consumer who suffered a loss, and impose civil 
penalties on those who willfully violate the law, while addressing the 
specific types of problematic enforcement practices documented in this 
Article. 
II. UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE ACTS: ORIGIN AND 
PURPOSE 
In 1914, Congress established the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC).4  The FTC consisted, as it does today, of five members appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.5  When 
Congress passed the FTC Act, it was concerned about the growth and 
spread of monopolies, so the law charged the FTC with regulating 
“unfair methods of competition,”6 and in the beginning, the Commission 
focused largely on antitrust and other trade regulation violations. 
After the Supreme Court found that the FTC lacked power to 
regulate activities that had no effect on competition between businesses, 
                                                          
 3.   Private rights of action brought under UDAP laws, which raise their own distinct set of 
concerns, are beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, 
Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 4.   See Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012)). 
 5.   See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
 6.   See Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914). 
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such as false advertising,7 Congress empowered the Commission to 
regulate consumer transactions in 1938 by amending Section 5(a)(1) of 
the FTC Act to declare unlawful all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in commerce.”8  The FTC Act itself provided little guidance as to which 
activities were “unfair” or “deceptive,” because in 1914, when Congress 
extensively debated the definition of “unfair,” it recognized that “it 
would undertake an endless task” by attempting to provide an exhaustive 
list of prohibited practices.9  For this reason, Congress decided, by a 
“general declaration,” to condemn “unfair” practices and “leave it to the 
commission to determine what practices were unfair.”10  Congress 
adopted this same approach when it amended the Act in 1938 to include 
“unfair or deceptive acts” in consumer transactions. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, most states adopted UDAP laws to 
supplement federal consumer protection enforcement.11  Most UDAP 
laws were based on alternative forms suggested by the FTC12 or model 
state legislation developed by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws.13  Today, every state has a consumer protection 
statute.14  While these laws take various forms, most generally prohibit 
“unfair” and “deceptive” acts.15  Some UDAP laws include a non-
                                                          
 7.   See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 654 (1931) (holding the FTC lacked authority to 
issue cease-and-desist order to stop advertising of an ineffective weight-loss product); see also FTC 
v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934) (suggesting that Congress should expand the 
power of the FTC to regulate unfair practices that exploit consumers); ANN. REP. OF THE FED. 
TRADE COMM’N at 14–15 (1935), reprinted in 6 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 4836, 4836–37 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1983) [hereinafter 
Kintner] (advocating for a statutory change). 
 8.   Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012)).  
 9.   H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.). 
 10.   S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 13 (1914), reprinted in 5 Kintner, supra note 7, at 3900, 3909–10. 
 11.   J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial 
Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 357 (1992); Jack E. Karns, State 
Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little FTC Acts”: Should Federal Standards 
Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 374 (1990). 
 12.   See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAW, in SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION C4–C5 (1969); see generally William A. 
Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 275 (1971). 
 13.   UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (amended 1966), 7A U.L.A. 139 (2002) 
(withdrawn from recommendation 2000). 
 14.   See Karns, supra note 11, at 373 n.2 (citing state statutes). 
 15.   See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.471(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 10-1-393(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.170 (West 2006); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 51:1405 (2003 & Supp. 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West 2006); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 
2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-1.1(a) (West 2012); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
646.608(1)(u) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (West 2011).  
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exclusive list of specifically prohibitive practices,16 but like the FTC Act, 
they do not define the broad contours of what constitutes “unfair” and 
“deceptive.”  The terms were intentionally left as undefined so that the 
UDAP laws could adapt to future business practices.17 
The task for defining these terms was left to state officials and the 
courts.  Most UDAP laws provide the AG with rulemaking authority, 
which generally allows the AG to issue rules and regulations interpreting 
the law and establishing prohibited conduct.18  In determining what 
constitutes an “unfair” or “deceptive” act state courts are often required 
by their UDAP statute to look to FTC policies, orders, regulations, and 
rulings for guidance.  This statutory deference can require the states’ 
courts to give “consideration”19 or “due consideration and great 
                                                          
The District of Columbia’s statute, however, does not explicitly recognize a violation of the act for 
“unfair” trade practices, and courts have not permitted such actions.  See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904 
(West 2015); Atwater v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 566 A.2d 462, 465 (D.C. 
1989). 
 16.   See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.471(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014); ARK. CODE 
ANN. §§ 4-88-107(a), 88-109 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-105(1) (West 2002 & 
Supp. 2013); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(a)-(hh) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(b) (West 
2003 & Supp. 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
714.16(2) (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903(1) (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
325D.44 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2013); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1345.02(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 753 (West 2013); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.608(1) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 
17.46(b) (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-102(7) (West Supp. 2013). 
 17.   Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety 
Net: Using State Unfair Practices Law to Make Handguns and Other Consumer Goods Safer, 17 
YALE J. ON REG. 253, 279–80 (2000). 
 18.   See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.491 (West 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
110b (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-394 (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16(4)(a) (West 
2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.180 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (West 
2006) (authorizing the attorney general to make rules and regulations “interpreting the provisions” of 
the UDAP statute); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-27(1)(f) (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-13 
(West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(B)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 13-2-5 (West 2010) (authorizing rules to “administer and enforce” UDAP statute). 
 19.   See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West 2008). 
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weight”20 while others require interpretation of state law to be “guided”21 
or be “consistent”22 with FTC actions. 
While these laws are sometimes referred to as “Little FTC Acts,” 
there are some critical differences between UDAP laws and the FTC Act.  
When Congress enacted the FTC Act, it was concerned that the 
vagueness of the terms “unfair” and “deceptive” could lead to arbitrary 
and abusive lawsuits and punish businesses without prior notice that the 
conduct at issue was improper.  Congress alleviated some of these 
concerns by placing the power to determine unfair practices in a 
nonpartisan Commission23 and by providing the FTC with sole 
enforcement authority.24  The FTC’s broad authority to bring actions is 
further tempered by budgetary and staffing restraints.  The FTC has to 
balance these restraints and prioritize those actions that best serve public 
interest.25  Congress also recognized that the FTC’s power under the Act 
is “merely preventive and cooperative, rather than penal.”26  The FTC 
can immediately act to stop deceptive practices and seek restitution for 
consumers.27  Civil penalties are reserved for situations in which the 
violator had “actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or 
deceptive and is unlawful,”28 and the FTC can only seek civil penalties 
on businesses that violate a cease-and-desist order, consent agreement, or 
had clear notice that conduct is prohibited.29 
                                                          
 20.   See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-6 (2002); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.545 (West 2007); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204(2) (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-604 (West 2006); MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW § 13-105 (West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1345.02(C) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.1-3 (West 2006). 
 21.   See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522 (2013 & Supp. 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 42-110(b) (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207(1) (West 2013); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(b) (West 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:13 (2009); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 57-12-4 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(b) 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.920 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 46A-6-101 (West 2002). 
 22.   See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-391 (West 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-115 (West 
2002 & Supp. 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-2(4) (West 2010). 
 23.   See 51 CONG. REC. 13099, 13101 (1914) (statement of Sen. Newlands). 
 24.   See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52(a)(1), 54(a) (2012); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 
986, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 25.   See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012) (requiring the Commission to find that bringing an action in 
federal court to enjoin a violation of the FTC Act is in the public interest). 
 26.   See S. REP. NO. 74-1705, at 1 (1936). 
 27.   See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), 53(b), 57(b) (2012). 
 28.   See id. § 45(m)(1)(B) (2012). 
 29.   See id. § 45(l)–(m) (2012). 
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UDAP laws also empower state AGs to seek restitution and 
injunctions.30  Unlike federal law, however, most UDAP laws allow the 
AG to immediately seek civil penalties,31 which can range from a 
maximum of $1,000 to $50,000 per violation.32  Even for the states with 
a relatively low maximum penalty, these civil penalties can be 
substantial considering that the “per violation” penalty can be based on 
every prescription filled, letter sent, product sold, or advertisement 
published or aired.  Rhode Island is the only state that follows the FTC 
model and requires a violation of the terms of an injunction before 
imposing civil penalties.33 
UDAP laws also provide for wider enforcement than the FTC Act.  
Unlike the FTC Act, some UDAP laws allow for local enforcement by 
county district attorneys and city attorneys.34  In addition, all UDAP laws 
provide for a private right of action,35 and some allow for consumer class 
                                                          
 30.   See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2522, 2523 
(West 2011 & Supp. 2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-397 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 48-606 (West 2006); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/7 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-
5-0.5-4 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16 (West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 5, § 209 (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 4 (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
407.100 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:4 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07 
(West 2004 & Supp. 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 756.1 (West 2013); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 6-13.1-5 (West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-108 (West 2002); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 17.47 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2458 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013). 
 31.   See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113 (2003); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (West 
2008 & Supp. 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2522(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 501.2075 (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(g) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 50-636 (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-19(1)(b) (West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 358-A:4(III)(b) (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-13 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
761.1(C) (West 2013); 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2018 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 9, § 2458(b)(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.26 (West 2010); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-12-113 (West 2007). 
 32.   See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(i) (West 2015) ($1,000); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
505/7(b) (West 2008) ($50,000). 
 33.   See 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.1-8 (West 2006).  A handful of other states require the 
state AG to contact a business before filing a UDAP enforcement action, but permit the AG to seek 
civil penalties even if the business offers to immediately address the concern.  See, e.g., ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 209 (West 2013) (requiring AG to provide a person with at least ten days’ notice 
of the intended action, and give the person an opportunity to confer with the AG); N.Y. GEN. BUS. 
LAW § 349(c) (McKinney 2012) (requiring AG to give business notice and an opportunity to show 
in writing within five business days why proceedings should not be instituted, unless AG finds 
notice is not in the public interest); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-108(a)(2) (West 2002) (requiring ten 
days’ notice). 
 34.   See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-4(a)(1)–(3) (2002); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17203–06 
(West 2008 & Supp. 2014); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/7(a)–(b) (West 2008); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 75-24-21 (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.020(4) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 39-5-130 (1985); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.48 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 
59.1-201(A), 59.1-201.1 (West 2011). 
 35.   See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really 
Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 173 (2011). 
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or representative actions.36  When Congress debated the FTC Act, a 
private right of action was considered and rejected due in part to concern 
with the potential for abusive litigation.37  The legislative history of the 
FTC Act shows that the primacy of the Commission in setting consumer 
protection policy was an essential consideration at its inception.38 
Enforcement of the FTC Act is placed solely with the government 
regulators, not private attorneys.  An executive order prohibits federal 
agencies from hiring outside lawyers on a contingency-fee basis.39  Most 
state AGs do not have this limitation, and AGs, as well as local county 
district attorneys and city attorneys, have retained outside lawyers to 
represent the government on a contingency-fee basis to pursue their 
UDAP enforcement actions.  The ability to hire contingency-fee 
attorneys diminishes some of the safeguards that were built into the FTC 
Act to help alleviate congressional concerns over the broad types of 
claims that could be pursued and the potential for abuse.  By using 
contingency-fee arrangements, the AG is not constrained by the budget 
or staff of his or her office, nor does the AG need to prioritize claims that 
most benefit the public welfare.  In addition, a private attorney’s 
financial interest in a monetary award creates a strong incentive to seek 
the maximum civil penalty rather than an immediate injunction or other 
corrective action, which might be more appropriate in certain cases.  The 
disincentives to first seek equitable relief turn the UDAP action into a 
penal rather than a cooperative and preventive action. 
Another difference is the level of proof required to show a violation.  
Most UDAP laws do not require an AG to show that the consumer relied 
on the defendant’s allegedly deceptive act.40  In some states, all an AG 
                                                          
 36.   See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1)(B) (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-
608(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(c), (d) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(2) (West 2006); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(2) (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (West 2004 & 
Supp. 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.638(8) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 6-13.1-5.2(b) (West 2006). 
 37.   See 51 CONG. REC. 13099, 13106 (1914) (statement of Sen. Stone). 
 38.   See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 3, at 7–15 (discussing the legislative history of the 
FTC Act). 
 39.   See Exec. Order No. 13,433, Protecting American Taxpayers from Payment of 
Contingency Fees, 72 Fed. Reg. 28441 (May 16, 2007). 
 40.   See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.471 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 44-1522(A) (2013 & Supp. 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(a) (West 2011); 815 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16(2)(a) (West 2003); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 50-626(b) (2005 & Supp. 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.170 (West 2006); MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.69(1) (2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
407.020(3) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.0915 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 51-15-02 (West 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-110(a), (c) (1985); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
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needs to show to establish a UDAP violation is that the representation 
had the tendency to deceive or was capable of misleading someone, and 
it is typically not necessary to prove that a consumer was actually injured 
by the alleged misrepresentation.41  On the other hand, the FTC has 
moved away from a tendency or capacity to deceive the general public 
and adopted more of a “reasonable” consumer standard.42  Under this 
standard, a practice or omission is deceptive if (1) it is likely to mislead 
consumers; (2) the consumer’s interpretation of the representation is 
“reasonable” under the circumstances; and (3) the representation is 
“material” in that it is likely to affect either a consumer’s choice of 
whether to purchase a product or the consumer’s health or safety in its 
use.43  In order to qualify as “unfair” the FTC requires that the act 
“causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”44 
The daily enforcement of UDAP laws by AGs is generally 
uncontroversial and can often benefit the public.  AGs receive 
complaints, conduct investigations, and mediate disputes.  AGs take 
action to immediately stop illegal conduct and, where appropriate, seek 
refunds or other relief for affected consumers.  The differences between 
UDAP laws and the FTC Act, however, can create opportunities for 
abuse.  The government’s ability to immediately seek large civil 
penalties, investigate and litigate through contingency-fee attorneys, and 
rely on a low standard of proof creates a strong incentive for states to 
                                                          
§ 46A-6-102(7)(M) (West Supp. 2013); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461(b) (West 2007) 
(requiring either reliance or that consumer “sustain[] damages or injury as a result of any false or 
fraudulent . . . [prohibited] practice[s]”). 
 41.   See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904 (West 2015) (stating that a person violates the law 
“whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby”); MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW §§ 13-301(1), 13-302 (West 2013) (providing that the capacity or tendency to deceive 
establishes a violation “whether or not any consumer in fact has been misled, deceived, or damaged 
as a result of that practice”); People ex rel. Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 
470–471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding the test is “whether the public is likely to be deceived . . . 
even if no one was actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice, or sustained any damage.”) 
(citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996)); State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 294 S.E.2d 781, 783 (S.C. 1982) (finding a tendency to 
deceive and mislead without proof of actual deception is sufficient to establish liability). 
 42.   See Letter from James C. Miller III, FTC Chairman, to Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman of 
House Comm’n on Energy & Commerce, FTC Policy Statement on Deception 1 (Oct. 14, 1983), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf. 
 43.   See id. at 1–2. 
 44.   See Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108 
Stat. 1691, 1695 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012)) (explaining when an act or practice 
can be declared unlawful on the ground that it is unfair). 
2016 STATE AG ENFORCEMENT OF UDAP LAWS 217 
bring UDAP actions, especially in cases where the defendant is 
considered an unpopular industry or viewed as having deep pockets. 
III. FOUR PROBLEMS IN STATE AG ENFORCEMENT OF UDAP LAWS 
A. Contracting Out Enforcement to Private Law Firms 
As noted above, although the federal government does not hire 
outside counsel on a contingency-fee basis to pursue consumer 
protection or other enforcement actions,45 this practice is common with 
respect to certain types of UDAP actions brought by AGs. 
A common thread through many of the UDAP enforcement actions 
that have raised controversy is that they did not originate with a 
government-identified need to protect consumers.  Rather, private 
attorneys develop the theories of liability, approach state AGs, and then 
litigate the state’s enforcement action in exchange for a contingency fee.  
For example, when Pennsylvania AG Linda Kelly hired outside counsel 
in 2012 to investigate the state’s nursing home industry, the Philadelphia 
Inquirer reported that “it was Cohen Milstein that dreamed up the 
initiative and sold it to the Attorney General’s Office to obtain a no-bid 
contract.”46 
Some AGs have retained law firms to represent their states through 
no-bid contracts.  In Louisiana, outside lawyers hired by former AG 
Buddy Caldwell collected more than $54 million during his tenure.47  
The law firms he hired included those of his campaign manager and 
treasurer, whose firms and relatives gave thousands to the AG’s 
                                                          
 45.   Exec. Order No. 13,433, supra note 39. 
 46.   Craig R. McCoy & Angela Couloumbis, As Penna. Targets Nursing Homes, Law Firm 
Could Benefit, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 1, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-06-
01/news/62882740_1_kathleen-kane-nursing-homes-law-firm; see also Andrew Staub, Pennsylvania 
AG’s Use of Outside Law Firms Draws Scrutiny, PA. WATCHDOG (Sept. 2, 2015), 
http://watchdog.org/236326/contingency-fee-law-firms-kane/.  Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, 
for example, has an entire section devoted to generating state AG actions.  See Practice Areas: 
Public Client, COHEN MILSTEIN, http://www.cohenmilstein.com/practice-area/public-client (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2016).  The firm, which is known for bringing class action lawsuits, donated over 
$70,000 to state AG campaigns between 2010 and 2015.  See Jessica M. Karmasek, Cohen Milstein 
Law Firm Strengthening Relationships with State AGs, Earning Millions, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Apr. 
21, 2015), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510550711-cohen-milstein-law-firm-strengthening-
relationships-with-state-ags-earning-millions. 
 47.   See Eric Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays by Coaxing Attorneys General to Sue, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/lawyers-create-big-paydays-
by-coaxing-attorneys-general-to-sue-.html?_r=1. 
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campaigns.48  Even after the Louisiana legislature passed a law clarifying 
that state law prohibits state officials from hiring outside lawyers on a 
contingency-fee basis without legislative authorization, Caldwell 
contracted out seven new UDAP lawsuits on the basis that they fell under 
retention agreements approved before the law took effect.49  Jeff Landry, 
Caldwell’s successor, cancelled many of these contracts entered by 
Caldwell, citing a “pattern of abuse.”50 
Legal scholarship,51 think tank papers,52 reports,53 congressional 
testimony,54 and the mainstream media have widely criticized state hiring 
of outside counsel on a contingency-fee basis.55  Critics note that such 
arrangements raise conflicts of interest and ethical and constitutional 
                                                          
 48.   See, e.g., David Hammer, New Questions Emerge About Outgoing AG Caldwell’s 
Contracts, 4 WWL-TV (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.wwltv.com/news/local/investigations/david-
hammer/new-questions-emerge-about-outgoing-ag-caldwells-
contracts_20160219040938198/47981732. 
 49.   See id. 
 50.   David Hammer, Attorney General Announces Policy Changes After Eyewitness 
Investigations, 4 WWL-TV (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.wwltv.com/news/local/investigations/david-
hammer/attorney-general-announces-policy-changes-after-eyewitness-investigations/59183853. 
 51.   See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: 
Constitutional and Political Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77 (2010); see also Richard O. 
Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The Transmutation of Public Nuisance 
Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 968; Leah Godesky, Comment, State Attorneys General and 
Contingency Fee Arrangements: An Affront to the Neutrality Doctrine?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 587 (2009); Katherine McDonald, Comment, “Pay to Sue” – Contingency-Fee 
Arrangements When Representing the State: A Review of Section 25-16-702 of the Arkansas Code, 
66 ARK. L. REV. 775 (2013). 
 52.   See, e.g., James R. Copland, Trial Lawyers, Inc.: Attorneys General — A Report on the 
Alliance Between State AGs and the Plaintiffs’ Bar, MANHATTAN INST., CENTER FOR LEGAL POLICY 
(2011), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/trial-lawyers-inc-attorneys-general-report-alliance-
between-state-ags-and-plaintiffs-bar-2011. 
 53.   See Inst. for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber, Lawsuit Ecosystem II: New Trends, Targets 
and Players 95–109 (2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/ 
1/evolving.pdf; Inst. for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber, Unprincipled Prosecution: Abuse of Power 
and Profiteering in the New ‘Litigation Swarm’ (2014), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/unprincipled-prosecution.pdf; Inst. for Legal 
Reform, U.S. Chamber, Privatizing Public Enforcement: The Legal, Ethical and Due-Process 
Implications of Contingency-Fee Arrangements in the Public Sector (2013), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/PublicInterestPrivateProfit_FINAL. 
pdf. 
 54.   See Contingent Fees and Conflicts of Interest in State AG Enforcement of Federal Law: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
(2012) (statement of the Hon. William McCollum, former Fla. AG, on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and the U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg72692/html/CHRG-112hhrg72692.htm; id. (statement of James R. Copeland, Dir. and 
Senior Fellow, Ctr. for Legal Policy, Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research). 
 55.   See, e.g., Eric Lipton, supra note 47; Editorial, The Pay-to-Sue-Business, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123984994639523745. 
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concerns,56 and contribute to a “pay-to-play” culture as the hired law 
firms often contribute heavily to AG campaigns.57  For instance, over the 
past decade, Mississippi AG Jim Hood received $395,000 in campaign 
contributions from outside attorneys,58 and in turn, outside attorneys 
hired by AG Hood have made nearly $90 million in attorney fees and 
expenses in just the past five years.59  Some question whether 
government enforcement actions brought through private lawyers hired 
on a contingency-fee basis leads to actions that protect consumers or 
primarily benefit private lawyers and the AGs who hire them. 
In some cases, AGs have delegated the state’s broad subpoena 
power, allowing private lawyers to investigate whether the state should 
bring an enforcement action—the only way the law firm will be 
compensated for the work of its attorneys.  For instance, the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office has about 180 lawyers on staff, 
but, as attorney general, Kathleen Kane retained four private law firms 
that made significant contributions to her campaigns between 2011 and 
2013 to conduct such investigations.60  Between March and August 
2014, the state served subpoenas on for-profit nursing homes operating 
in Pennsylvania.61  These subpoenas were issued by a Cohen Milstein 
paralegal acting as “representative of the attorney general authorized to 
serve a subpoena” in conjunction with a deputy state attorney general, 
                                                          
 56.   The U.S. Supreme Court has warned that a “scheme injecting a personal interest, financial 
or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the 
prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise serious constitutional questions.”  Marshall v. 
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980) (rejecting constitutional challenge but nonetheless 
recognizing requirement of neutrality and impartiality in enforcement proceeding); see also Tumey 
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).  The Court has also recognized that private attorneys appointed 
to represent the government “certainly should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who 
undertakes such a prosecution.”  Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 
804 (1987) (precluding lawyers prosecuting a criminal contempt action against individuals who 
violated an injunction against trademark infringement from having a financial stake in the case). 
 57.   See Lipton, supra note 47. 
 58.   See id. (reporting that the campaign contributions received by AG Hood over the past 
decade were more than any other AG during that time). 
 59.   See Office of the Attorney General State of Miss., Attorney General Contingent Fund 
Attorneys Fees and Expenses (June 16, 2016), http://www.ago.state.ms.us/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Contingent-Fund-Attorney-Payments.pdf. 
 60.   Brad Bumsted, State’s No-Bid Contracts with Private Law Firms Prompt Scrutiny, TRIB. 
LIVE (Jan. 24, 2015, 10:00 PM), http://triblive.com/politics/politicalheadlines/7507979-74/general-
kane-firms (reporting nearly $200,000 in contributions to Kane’s campaigns from the law firms 
hired to conduct investigations and noting that the lawyers and staff of nine law firms holding 
contracts with AG Kane’s office collectively donated $362,199 to her campaign). 
 61.   Id.  An attorney representing the nursing home chains observed that the lawsuit appeared 
to target nursing homes “based on their apparent wealth,” as the state’s action did not include not-
for-profit establishments to which the claims could equally apply.  McCoy & Couloumbis, supra 
note 46. 
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and served by the law firm.62  Kane then brought an action against the 
facilities, claiming the nursing homes violated Pennsylvania’s Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law because the facilities’ 
staffing levels were inadequate to support statements of quality service 
included in marketing.63 
Private attorneys representing the state may exercise significant 
control over the theories alleged and the day-to-day litigation of the case.  
Most courts have not categorically barred AGs from hiring attorneys on a 
contingency-fee basis to litigate civil cases,64 but several courts have 
required government lawyers to exert some degree of control over the 
litigation.65  In practice, however, this test has been fairly easy to 
satisfy.66  Some courts have found that a statement in the retention 
agreement providing that the government retains ultimate control over 
the litigation and a minimal showing of government involvement in the 
litigation and any settlement may be sufficient.67 
For example, in 2009, Kentucky AG Jack Conway filed a lawsuit 
against Merck under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act for claims 
related to the company’s marketing of Vioxx.  About one year after filing 
the claim, AG Conway retained an outside law firm to litigate the case on 
a contingency-fee basis.  Merck sought relief in federal court, arguing 
that the outside counsel, Garmer & Prather, controlled the litigation.  The 
pharmaceutical maker presented specific examples showing how the 
government attorney charged with overseeing the litigation lacked real 
involvement.68  Merck pointed out that the contract required that the 
                                                          
 62.   McCoy & Couloumbis, supra note 46. 
 63.   Complaint and Petition for Injunctive Relief at 1, 5, Commonwealth v. Golden Gate Nat’l 
Senior Care LLC, No. 336 MD 2015 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 1, 2015). 
 64.   But see Meredith v. Ieyoub, 700 So. 2d 478, 484 (La. 1997) (ruling that Louisiana’s 
Attorney General lacked authority to enter into contingency-fee contracts with private lawyers to 
represent the state and that, absent legislative authorization, such contracts violate state law). 
 65.   See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 36 (Cal. 2010); State v. Lead 
Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 475 (R.I. 2008). 
 66.   See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Conway, 947 F. Supp. 2d 733, 733 (E.D. Ky. 2013); 
Cephalon Inc. v. Wilson, No. 2012-cp-40-07317, at 8–9 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl., 5th Jud. Cir., June 2, 
2014) (Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment); State ex rel. Discover Fin. 
Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625, 639–40 (W. Va. 2013); Maria Chutchian, SC AG Can’t Skirt 
AstraZeneca Improper Penalty Claims, LAW360 (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
295720/scagcantskirtastrazenecaimproperpenaltyclaims?. 
 67.   Pennsylvania’s high court has insulated agreements between state officials and private 
lawyers from judicial scrutiny by finding that those named as defendants lack standing to challenge 
the state’s retention practices.  See Commonwealth v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 8 A.3d 267, 276–
77 (Pa. 2010). 
 68.   Merck, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 733; see also Alison Frankel, Judge: Kentucky AG Can Use 
Contingency-Fee Lawyers in Case vs Merck, REUTERS (May 28, 2013), 
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outside counsel assume a “lead role in investigating and . . . preparing 
[the] litigation.”69  The AG’s staff failed to make any “substantive 
revisions” or contributions to court filings.70  Outside counsel submitted 
the briefs filed in the multi-district litigation, signed letters to the court, 
and rejected a settlement offer.71  The government attorney responsible 
for supervising the litigation only participated in some status 
conferences, never spoke on the record, could only identify the role of 
seven of the state’s sixty-five witnesses, and did not know whether the 
state had retained expert witnesses.72 
The federal district court considering the case, however, did not find 
the government’s lack of knowledge of the details of its own 
enforcement action troubling.  Rather, it viewed the government’s 
attorney as “performing poorly on a few ‘pop quizzes.’”73  But the court 
did find one close call: the list of forty-five claimed violations of the 
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act was cut-and-pasted from one 
produced by the same outside counsel in a lawsuit brought on behalf of 
the State of Alaska.74  The court viewed the government’s lack of 
involvement in shaping the claims as a “disappointingly casual 
approach.”75  Nevertheless, the court concluded that the AG retained and 
exercised decision making authority in the underlying litigation and 
Merck’s due process rights were not violated.76  Merck appealed, but the 
underlying litigation settled before a Sixth Circuit decision. 
Delegating government law enforcement authority can also 
complicate settlement because outside counsel with a contingency-fee 
arrangement have an incentive to seek the highest recovery, rather than 
agree to injunctive or other relief.  Some retention agreements between 
states and private lawyers have limited the ability of a state to settle for 
nonmonetary relief.  For example, when Nevada AG Catherine Cortez 
Masto hired attorneys at Cohen Milstein to sue Lender Processing 
Services (LPS) over its alleged misconduct in providing support services 
                                                          
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/05/28/judge-kentucky-ag-can-use-contingency-fee-
lawyers-in-case-vs-merck/. 
 69.   Merck, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 742–43. 
 70.   Id. at 746–47. 
 71.   Id. at 750. 
 72.   Id. at 745–50. 
 73.   Id. at 746. 
 74.   Id. at 747. 
 75.   Id. 
 76.   Id. at 752. 
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for mortgage lenders,77 the retention agreement gave the private firm 
“virtual veto power” over any settlement offer.78  The AG’s office agreed 
not to settle claims against the mortgage lender for injunctive relief 
unless the defendant provided costs and hourly fees for the law firm’s 
services.79  Forty-six states and the District of Columbia settled UDAP 
claims with the company in January 2013,80 following earlier settlements 
with three individual states.81  Nevada, the only state to hire lawyers on a 
contingency-fee basis to pursue LPS, held out.82  As a lawyer for the 
company observed, the Nevada case continued “because they have a 
class-action law firm running this. The attorney general is not running 
this.”83  Only after a state court judge sanctioned the state for failing to 
produce evidence of the number of consumer protection violations the 
state had alleged,84 did the litigation settle.85 
Pennsylvania’s retention agreement with Cohen Milstein to 
investigate nursing home practices had a similar restriction on settlement.  
Initially, a provision in the contract barred the state from settling the 
lawsuit other than for a financial payment.  The state could not, for 
example, accept a promise from the facilities to increase staffing or 
                                                          
 77.   Complaint, Nevada v. Lender Processing Servs. Inc., No. A-11-653289-B (Nev. Dist. Ct., 
8th Judicial Dist., Dec. 15, 2011). 
 78.   Amanda Bronstad, Cohen Milstein Role Under Fire in Robo-Signing Case, AM. LAWYER 
(June 3, 2013), http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202602750436. 
 79.   Nevada’s actions reportedly threatened to unravel LPS’s settlement with other states 
because the agreement allowed states to renegotiate if any state gets a different deal.  See Editorial, 
What Doesn’t Stay in Vegas, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000 
1424127887323469804578523700441000298. 
 80.   David McLaughlin, LPS Reaches $120 Million Deal in ‘Robosigning’ Probe, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-31/lps-reaches-120-
million-deal-with-states-in-foreclosure-probe. 
 81.   Chris Sieroty, Nevada Is Last State Standing as Mortgage Processor Reaches Settlement, 
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/housing/nevada-last-
state-standing-mortgage-processor-reaches-settlement. 
 82.   See Editorial, What Doesn’t Stay in Vegas, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com /articles/ SB10001424127887323469804578523700441000298. 
 83.   Tim O’Reiley, Sanctions Could Cost Nevada Attorney General $1 Million or More, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/sanctions-could-cost-
nevada-attorney-general-1-million-or-more (quoting Mitchell Berger). 
 84.   See Ken Ritter, Nevada AG Sanctioned in Lender Fraud Civil Lawsuit, LAS VEGAS SUN 
(Jan. 31, 2014), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2014/jan/31/nevada-ag-sanctioned-lender-fraud-civil-
lawsuit/; Andrew Scurria, Nev. AG Sanctioned in Lender Processing Fraud Suit, LAW360 (Jan. 31, 
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/505918/nev-ag-sanctioned-in-lender-processing-fraud-
suit?article_related_content=1. 
 85.   See Ken Ritter, Nevada AG Takes Deal in Lender Fraud Civil Lawsuit, ELKO DAILY FREE 
PRESS (Feb. 16, 2014), http://elkodaily.com/news/nevada-ag-takes-deal-in-lender-fraud-civil-
lawsuit/article_0e582bec-973c-11e3-aa7c-001a4bcf887a.html. 
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otherwise improve conditions.86  The agreement was later amended to 
allow a settlement that provides injunctive relief but no financial 
recovery, while requiring the AG’s office to “use its best efforts to 
negotiate for the payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees as a settlement 
term.”87 
Even where the retention agreement does not restrict nonmonetary 
settlements, such arrangements may permit a law firm to make 
unreasonable demands that do not serve consumer interests.  For 
instance, in multi-state litigation claiming that Eli Lilly violated UDAP 
and other laws by marketing Zyprexa for purposes other than treating 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, Bailey Perrin Bailey (BPB) was the 
main settlement holdout.  BPB handled the Zyprexa litigation for three 
states—Arkansas, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania—and were among a 
group of law firms representing South Carolina.88  Thirty-three states that 
sued Lilly entered a $62 million settlement in October 2008.89  Several 
additional states (also represented by outside counsel) followed, entering 
individual settlements.  With the exception of Pennsylvania, the states 
represented by BPB were among the few hold outs.90  These “slash-and-
burn” tactics backfired after a federal judge dismissed most of 
Mississippi’s claims.91  Faced with the possibility of collecting nothing, 
Mississippi AG Jim Hood entered an $18.5 million settlement with Eli 
Lilly in February 2010—an amount that was a fraction of the civil 
penalties BPB had sought.92  Arkansas settled for the same amount at 
that time.93  In the settlements resolving the Mississippi and Arkansas 
                                                          
 86.   McCoy & Couloumbis, supra note 46. 
 87.   See Petitioners’ Brief in Opposition to Respondents’ Preliminary Objections to the 
Amended Petition for Review, at 5, GGNSC Clarion LP v. Kane, No. 165 MD 2015, at 5 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Sept. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Brief]. 
 88.   The Arkansas and Mississippi arrangements especially raised eyebrows, as Texas-based 
BPB and its lawyers had reportedly donated $70,000 to the Arkansas Democratic Party and $75,000 
to Mississippi attorney general Jim Hood’s reelection campaign.  See John O’Brien, Lilly Settles Ark. 
Suit Brought by Bailey Firm, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Feb. 18, 2010), 
http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510522422-lilly-settles-ark-suit-brought-by-bailey-firm. 
 89.   See Alex Berenson, 33 States to Get $62 Million in Zyprexa Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/business/07zyprexa.html. 
 90.   See John O’Brien, Judge Sides with Eli Lilly in Zyprexa Case, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Dec. 1, 
2009), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510521961-judge-sides-with-eli-lilly-in-zyprexa-case; John 
O’Brien, Zyprexa Settlements Piling Up, Four States Remain, W. VA. REC. (Sept. 21, 2009), 
http://wvrecord.com/stories/510596826-zyprexa-settlements-piling-up-four-states-remain. 
 91.   See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 463–64 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 92.   See John O’Brien, Lilly Decides to Settle with AG Hood, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510522340-lilly-decides-to-settle-with-ag-hood. 
 93.   State v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CV-2008-4722 (Ark. Cir. Ct., Pulaski Cty., Feb. 5, 2010) 
(Consent Judgment and Assurance of Voluntary Compliance). 
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litigation, respectively, outside lawyers including BPB received $3.7 
million and $2.8 million.94 
B. Regulating Already-Regulated Industries 
Most UDAP laws recognize the value of consistency between the 
policymaking of regulatory agencies charged with protecting consumers 
in a particular area and UDAP enforcement actions.  Such congruence 
respects the authority and expertise of government agencies, and 
provides predictability and fairness for businesses that rely on 
government decision making.  It also recognizes that there are alternative 
means, often through administrative systems, for addressing consumer 
complaints regarding regulated conduct. 
For these reasons, about two thirds of UDAP laws exempt from their 
scope conduct that is regulated, permitted, approved, or specifically 
authorized by state or federal agencies, or complies with government 
regulations.95  The language of these provisions varies from state to 
state.96  A few state laws exempt only conduct that is subject to and 
complies with FTC rules or orders.97  Other state laws are inapplicable to 
practices regulated by specific state entities, such as a state insurance 
commission or public utility board.98  In some states that lack a statutory 
regulatory compliance provision, courts have adopted similar 
principles.99 
                                                          
 94.   Chuck Bartels, Ark. Announces $18.5 Million Settlement with Eli Lilly, BOSTON.COM (Feb. 
16, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2010/02/16/ark_announces_ 
185m_settlement_with_eli_lilly/. 
 95.   See generally Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman & Christopher E. Appel, “That’s 
Unfair!” Says Who – The Government or Litigant?: Consumer Protection Claims Involving 
Regulated Conduct, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 93, 102–09 (2007) (surveying state law). 
 96.   See id. 
 97.   See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1523 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(b)(2) 
(West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16(14) (West 2003); TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 
17.49(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013); 2015 W. Va. Legis. Serv. Ch. 64 (S.B. 315) (2015) (amending 
W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-101(1)). 
 98.   DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(b)(3) (West 2011) (inapplicable to practices subject to 
jurisdiction of Public Service Commission or Insurance Commissioner); LA. STAT. ANN. § 
51:1406(1) (2003 & Supp. 2014) (inapplicable to actions subject to jurisdiction of public service 
commission, insurance commissioner, financial institutions and insurance regulators of other states, 
and federal banking regulators); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.020 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016) (generally 
inapplicable to any company regulated by department of insurance, division of credit unions, or 
division of finance); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-105(1) (2013) (inapplicable to “actions or 
transactions permitted under laws administered by the Montana public service commission or the 
state auditor”); TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (West 2011) (inapplicable to 
violations of insurance code). 
 99.   See generally Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 95, at 102–09. 
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Courts are inconsistent, however, in their interpretation and 
application of these provisions.100  For example, some courts have found 
that their state’s UDAP law does not apply to pharmaceutical marketing 
practices because the FDA already closely regulates them.101  Other 
courts, however, have allowed AGs to use UDAP laws to impose 
supplemental obligations on a company or industry or, more often, seek 
to impose civil fines under UDAP laws for what were considered minor 
(and often corrected) violations of other statutes or regulations. 
1. Use of FDA Warning Letters to Punish Prescription Drug Makers 
AGs have brought a surge of enforcement actions against drug 
makers challenging their marketing practices.  This is an area closely 
regulated by the FDA.  Each year, the FDA’s Office of Prescription Drug 
Promotion (OPDP) (formerly the Division of Drug Marketing, 
Advertising and Communications) reviews thousands of direct-to-
consumer advertisements, “dear doctor” letters,102 and other materials 
disseminated by pharmaceutical companies.103  When OPDP staff 
                                                          
 100.   See id. 
 101.   See, e.g., Bober v. Glaxo Wellcome PLC, 246 F.3d 934, 940–43 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding 
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act does not subject pharmaceutical 
makers to liability for statements authorized by federal law); Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 
1228, 1234–35 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (interpreting safe harbors of the Florida and Massachusetts 
consumer fraud laws); DePriest v. AstraZeneca Pharm., L.P., 351 S.W.3d 168, 178 (Ark. 2009) 
(finding that statements made in advertising that are supported by the FDA approved labeling fall 
within the safe harbor provision of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act as being actions 
permitted under the laws administered by the FDA and are not actionable); Prohias v. AstraZeneca 
Pharm., L.P., 958 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that claims brought under 
state law are preempted because they would conflict with federal law and FDA approved labeling); 
Duronio v. Merck & Co., No. 267003, 2006 WL 1628516, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. June 13, 2006) 
(finding trial court properly dismissed claim under Michigan Consumer Protection Act because the 
pharmaceutical marketing activities underlying the claim are authorized and regulated under laws 
administered by the FDA); White v. Wyeth, 705 S.E.2d 828, 838 (W. Va. 2010) (citing N.J. Citizen 
Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 842 A.2d 174, 177–78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) and De 
Bouse v. Bayer AG, 922 N.E.2d 309, 318 (Ill. 2009)) (finding, with respect to private rights of 
action, that the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act is not intended to cover 
prescription drug purchases because of the role of the physician in the consumer’s purchasing 
decision and the high degree of federal regulation of prescriptive drug product). 
 102.   “Dear Doctor” letters are also referred to as “Dear Healthcare Provider” letters.  State ex 
rel. McGraw v. Johnson & Johnson, 704 S.E.2d 677, 682 (W. Va. 2010). 
 103.   OPDP receives 6,000 to 8,000 submissions of pharmaceutical promotional materials each 
month.  See FDA, Keeping Drug Advertising Honest and Balanced, at 2 (2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM355368.pdf (interview with 
Thomas Abrams, Director of OPDP).  The FDA estimates that it will receive 83,000 submissions in 
FY 2015.  FDA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY 2015 JUSTIFICATIONS OF ESTIMATES 
FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 48 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Reports 
ManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM388309.pdf.  
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identifies a concern with such material, finding that it does not present a 
balanced assessment of the benefits and risks of the drug, or that it omits 
pertinent information, OPDP issues a warning letter.104 
FDA policy recognizes that these warning letters are “informal,” 
“advisory,” and “[do] not commit FDA to taking enforcement action.”105  
The FDA has explained to the U.S. Supreme Court that warning letters 
do “not mark the consummation of FDA’s decisionmaking process,” are 
“not based on a formal and complete administrative record,” are merely 
“tentative,” and “do not constitute final agency action.”106  Unlike formal 
FDA advisory opinions, warning letters are merely the judgment of a 
particular agency employee and “[do] not necessarily represent the 
formal position of [the] FDA, and [do] not bind or otherwise obligate or 
commit the agency to the views expressed.”107  There is no hearing or 
other process before the agency issues such a letter.  Nor is there any 
finding that the manufacturer’s conduct actually misled doctors or their 
patients.  Warning letters are not subject to challenge in court.108 
Typically, a warning letter requests that the manufacturer stop 
running an advertisement or issue a corrective letter to healthcare 
providers.  Manufacturers usually voluntarily and promptly comply with 
                                                          
 104.   OPDP issues enforcement letters asking companies to stop marketing claims that its staff 
views as unsupported or misleading.  These take the form of notice of violation letters (or “untitled 
letters”) for minor issues and warning letters for more serious concerns.  OPDP issued nine 
enforcement letters in 2015 (seven untitled letters and two warning letters), an amount that is less 
than typical.  See FDA, Warning Letters 2015, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLettersto
PharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm432949.htm#OPDP (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).  OPDP typically 
issues 30 to 50 enforcement letters each year.  See id. 
 105.   FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 4-1-1 (May 2, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/ 
ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/ucm176870.htm#SUB4-1-1 (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2016). 
 106.   Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 8–10, Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass’n v. 
FDA, 664 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1454), 2012 WL 3991471, at *9–10 (citing Bennet v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)); see also Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 10-CV-00147-ABJ, 
2010 WL 3119279, at *12 (D. Wyo. July 26, 2010), aff’d in pertinent part, 446 F. Appx. 964 (10th 
Cir. 2011); Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., 922 F. Supp. 299, 306 (C.D. Cal. 
1996) (citing Dietary Supplemental Coal., Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1992)) 
(“[R]egardless of any warning letters that the FDA may have sent to Defendants, it is clear that the 
FDA has not completed this investigation.”). 
 107.   FDA Advisory Opinions, 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(k) (2016). 
 108.   See Holistic Candlers, 664 F.3d at 944 (regarding the warning letters the court stated that 
“[i]t is plain, therefore, that ‘[n]o legal consequences flow from the agency’s conduct to date, for 
there has been no order compelling [the appellants] to do anything.’” (quoting Reliable Automatic 
Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d 726, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (second and 
third alterations in original)); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 
1983) (noting that letters do not “constitute a final decision by the FDA.”); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. 
FDA, 727 F. Supp. 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding a FDA letter was not the agency’s “final 
position.”). 
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the FDA’s request.  According to the FDA, “nearly all of [the issued 
warning letters] are resolved through discussions between FDA staff and 
those in the regulated industry.”109  After the FDA verifies that the 
manufacturer has taken corrective action that adequately addresses the 
concerns expressed in the warning letter, the FDA closes the matter.110 
While the FDA may view the issue as resolved, some AGs, acting 
through private counsel, have subsequently brought their own actions 
that rely on FDA warning letters as evidence of UDAP violations.  Cases 
in West Virginia, Arkansas, and South Carolina targeting the marketing 
of Risperdal, a drug that treats schizophrenia and symptoms of bipolar 
disorder, illustrate this trend. 
In August 2004, soon after FDA staff issued a warning letter 
expressing concern that a dear doctor letter Janssen sent to physicians 
about Risperdal did not adequately address the risks of hyperglycemia 
and diabetes, then-AG Darrell McGraw, Jr. brought an action under his 
state’s Consumer Credit and Protection Act.111  Janssen disputed the 
FDA’s assertions, but voluntarily complied by sending corrective 
information to doctors.112  Following that action, the FDA closed the 
matter.113  McGraw’s case was “based entirely on the statements and 
[alleged] omissions” identified in the FDA’s warning letter to Janssen.114  
The AG sought a civil penalty of $5,000 for each sales meeting and each 
dear doctor letter sent by the company to a West Virginia doctor.115  The 
Circuit Court of Brooke County found that the FDA’s warning letters 
conclusively established a violation of the state’s UDAP and imposed a 
$3,950,000 civil penalty.116 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing 
that when the FDA issues a warning letter it does not provide due 
process safeguards, such as prior notice, a hearing, or the ability to 
appeal.117  The letter indicates only FDA staff’s belief that a violation has 
                                                          
 109.   Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, Cody Labs., Inc., No. 
2:10-CV-00147-ABJ (2010), 2010 WL 3119279. 
 110.   FDA PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 105, at § 4-1-8. 
 111.   State ex rel. McGraw v. Johnson & Johnson, 704 S.E.2d 677, 681–82 (W. Va. 2010). 
 112.   See id. 
 113.   See id. at 683 (emphasis added). 
 114.   See id. 
 115.   See id. at 684. 
 116.   See Brief for the Appellee at 2, State ex rel. McGraw, 704 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2010), 2010 
WL 2824601, at *2.  The action also included a similar UDAP claim regarding the company’s 
marketing of Duragesic, a pain reliever.  The trial court imposed a $525,000 penalty for the 
company’s marketing of Duragesic resulting in a total penalty in the action of $4,475,000.  See id.; 
see also State ex rel. McGraw, 704 S.E.2d at 684.   
 117.   See State ex rel. McGraw, 704 S.E.2d at 689–91. 
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occurred, but is not conclusive.118  “It is fundamental,” the court found, 
“that every defendant is entitled to defend themselves against allegations 
of misconduct.”119 
The Arkansas Supreme Court reached a similar result when AG 
Dustin McDaniel brought an action against Janssen in 2007, after outside 
law firms approached his office.120  The state alleged violations of the 
Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and the Arkansas 
Medicaid Fraud False Claims Act based on the same dear doctor letter 
Janssen sent to physicians about Risperdal and the FDA’s warning 
letter.121  The state alleged 4,569 DTPA violations, based on the number 
of dear doctor letters sent to healthcare providers.122  The state referred to 
the warning letter repeatedly during the trial, including at least fifteen 
times in closing arguments alone.123  Upon a jury verdict for the state, the 
circuit court imposed a $2,500 fine per letter for a total of 
$11,422,500.124  The court awarded an additional $1.2 billion under the 
state’s Medicaid fraud statute, imposing a $5,000 fine for each of 
238,874 Risperdal prescriptions filled during the applicable time 
frame.125 
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the entire judgment.126  It 
found that the FDA warning letter was inadmissible as evidence because 
the letter was both prohibited hearsay and, even if it fell within an 
exception to the hearsay rule, it was more prejudicial than probative.127  
As a government-issued document, the FDA letter carried “inordinate 
weight” with the jury, yet it was the result of only an informal 
investigation, the court found.128  Given its reversal of the judgment, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court also reversed the $180.8 million in attorneys’ 
fees and costs awarded to the state based on its contingency-fee 
agreement with Bailey Perrin Bailey.129 
In South Carolina, a similar court judgment partially withstood 
appellate review.  There, then-AG Henry McMaster filed an action 
                                                          
 118.   Id. at 690. 
 119.   Id. (citing In re Charleston Gazette FOIA Request, 671 S.E.2d 776 (W. Va. 2008)). 
 120.   See Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. State, 432 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ark. 2014). 
 121.   See id. 
 122.   See id. at 569–70. 
 123.   Id. at 579. 
 124.   See id. at 570. 
 125.   See id. 
 126.   See id. at 580. 
 127.   See id. at 579–80. 
 128.   Id. at 579 (quoting Boude v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 277 P.3d 1221, 1225 (Mont. 2012)). 
 129.   See Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. State, 2014 Ark. 126, 126 (2014). 
2016 STATE AG ENFORCEMENT OF UDAP LAWS 229 
against Janssen under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act 
(SCUTPA) premised, in part, on the company’s sending the same dear 
doctor letter to physicians in his state.130  Private lawyers hired by 
McMaster to represent South Carolina131 used Janssen’s cooperation with 
the FDA as evidence that its dear doctor letter violated the Act.  
Plaintiffs’ lawyer Donald Coggins, Jr. of Harrison, White, Smith & 
Coggins, P.C. stated in his opening argument: 
[W]hen [the FDA Warning Letter] came along and issued that warning 
letter in April and ordered corrective action I think it’s instruct[ive] 
what Janssen did.  They could’ve appealed it, they could have contested 
it, they could have gone to court about it, they could have asked for 
some other type of sanction but what did they do?  They sent it out just 
like the FDA told them [to]. . . . [A]nd the [correction] letters clearly 
show and [sic] acknowledgement that they did wrong doing it.132 
In closing arguments, Coggins’ colleague, John Simmons, made 
similar assertions: 
The FDA concludes that the Dear Doctor Letter was false and 
misleading in a number of areas. . . . The FDA said you not only made 
affirmative misrepresentations in that Dear Doctor Letter, you omitted 
material information which is to say as being untruthful, which is to say 
as being imprudent, which is to say to be submitted unfair and 
deceptive. . . . [A]fter they received that warning letter, these 
defendants folded like a cheap suit.  The FDA wrote them that 
[warning] letter in April and said false and misleading. . . . It called 
them on what they did.  These defendants caved in immediately [and 
sent a correction letter].133 
                                                          
 130.   State ex rel. Wilson v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 777 S.E.2d 176, 188, 204 (S.C. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 824 (Jan. 11, 2016). 
 131.   See Litigation Retention Agreement for Special Counsel Appointed by the South Carolina 
Attorney General (Dec. 2010), http://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Antipsychotics-
litigation-retention-agreement-Janssen-plus-addenda.pdf; see also John O’Brien, S.C. AG McMaster 
Taking Contributions from Outside Counsel He Hired, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Sept. 24, 2009), 
http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510521545-s-c-ag-mcmaster-taking-contributions-from-outside-
counsel-he-hired.  “McMaster, who later ran unsuccessfully for governor, gave back $32,500 in 
donations from five lawyers he . . . hired to work on [these] lawsuits.”  See John O’Brien, South 
Carolina’s Risperdal Suit Goes to Trial, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://legalnewsline.com/ 
stories/510524330-south-carolina-s-risperdal-suit-goes-to-trial. 
 132.   Unofficial Transcript of Plaintiff’s Opening Statement, State ex rel. Wilson v. Ortho-
McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 07-CP-42-1438, 2011 WL 2066648, at *12 (S.C. Ct.  Com. Pl. 
Mar. 8, 2011). 
 133.   Unofficial Transcript of Plaintiff’s Closing Statement, State ex rel. Wilson, No. 07-CP-42-
1438, 2011 WL 2161889, at *8–9 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 21, 2011). 
230 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
Janssen’s counsel responded by pointing out that “[w]arning letters 
are inform[al], they’re advisory,” and “[t]hey’re not subject to appeal to 
anyone.”134  The jury determined that Janssen engaged in unfair or 
deceptive practices in its marketing.135  The trial court judge assessed the 
penalty: $4,000 for each of 7,184 dear doctor letters and each of 36,372 
follow up sales calls for a total of $174.2 million.136 
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that Janssen failed to 
preserve the issue of the admissibility of FDA warning letters, but even if 
it had done so, the court would have found the letters relevant to 
liability.137  The court affirmed the $4,000 civil penalty for each dear 
doctor letter sent, in July 2015.138  Recognizing that the follow up sales 
calls were to the same physicians that had received letters, and in many 
instances the same physicians received multiple calls, the court remitted 
the $4,000 per call penalty to $2,000 per call.139  As a result, the court 
reduced the portion of the civil penalty related to the dear doctor letter to 
$101.5 million.140 
Pharmaceutical companies have also had to respond to UDAP 
actions brought by local county district attorneys and city attorneys 
challenging pharmaceutical marketing.  In May 2014, the Orange 
County, California district attorney and the Santa Clara County district 
attorney retained outside counsel to bring a UDAP action on behalf of 
their residents against the major manufacturers of opioid painkillers such 
as OxyContin and Percocet.141  The complaint blames the manufacturers’ 
“aggressive marketing” for problems associated with the “epidemic” of 
painkiller addictions, including increased use of heroin, and seeks civil 
penalties, restitution, and injunctive relief.142  It alleges that the 
                                                          
 134.   See id. at *17. 
 135.   State ex rel. Wilson, No. 07-CP-42-1438, 2011 WL 2185861 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. June 3, 
2011) (Penalty Order).   
 136.   See id.  The total amount of the judgment including other penalties was $327 million.  See 
id. 
 137.   State ex rel. Wilson v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 777 S.E.2d 176, 191 (S.C. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 824 (Jan. 11, 2016). 
 138.   See id. at 204–05. 
 139.   See id.   
 140.   See id. at 205. 
 141.   See David McAfee, Calif. Counties Claim Pharma Cos. Lied About Opioid Safety, 
LAW360 (May 22, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/540839/calif-counties-claim-pharma-cos-
lied-about-opioid-safety.   
 142.   See Complaint for Violations of California False Advertising Law, California Unfair 
Competition Law, and Public Nuisance, Seeking Restitution, Civil Penalties, Abatement, and 
Injunctive Relief, People v. Purdue Pharma LP, Case No. 2014-00725287, at 10, 96–99 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. May 21, 2014), http://assets.law360news.com/0540000/540839/Complaint%201.pdf. 
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manufacturers misrepresented the off-label benefits of using opioids for 
common non-cancer chronic pain like back pain, arthritis, and 
headaches.143  As with the other pharmaceutical cases discussed above, 
the complaint references DDMAC warning letters as support for its 
marketing allegations.144  Weeks after the California case was filed, the 
city of Chicago, through some of the same private lawyers, brought a 
similar action against the manufacturers.145 
In the California case, Orange County Superior Court Judge Robert 
J. Moss granted the manufacturers’ motion to stay the case while the 
FDA studies the scientific and health policy issues regarding long-term 
opioid use.146  The court, exercising its inherent authority to manage its 
docket, dismissed the case without prejudice in August 2015.147  Judge 
Moss found that “[t]his action could lead to inconsistencies with the 
FDA’s findings, inconsistencies among the States, a lack of uniformity, 
and a potential chilling effect on the prescription of these drugs for those 
who need them most.”148  He recognized that the determinations the 
court would need to make, in order to rule on whether the marketing was 
improper, falls within the purview of the FDA, and he did not want to 
involve the court at this point “in an area which is best left to agencies 
such as the FDA who are designed to address such issues.”149 
Nevertheless, the Chicago case is ongoing.  Although a federal court 
declined to disqualify Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC from 
representing Chicago in December 2014,150 the court initially dismissed 
the case.  In a May 2015 ruling, Judge Jorge L. Alonso found that the 
FDA’s authority to regulate opioid marketing did not preclude the 
lawsuit, but that the city had not provided enough details supporting its 
consumer fraud allegations, such as a Chicago doctor or consumer who 
                                                          
 143.   See id. 
 144.   See id. at 13–14, 33, 70. 
 145.   Lance Duroni, Chicago Sues Pharma Cos. over Painkiller Marketing, LAW360 (June 3, 
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/544124/chicago-sues-pharma-cos-over-painkiller-
marketing?article_related_content=1. 
 146.   Y. Peter Kang, Drug Cos. Win Stay of False Ad Suit over Painkiller Safety, LAW360 (Aug. 
28, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/696825/drug-cos-win-stay-of-false-ad-suit-over-
painkiller-safety; Lisa Girion, Judge Halts Counties’ Lawsuit Against 5 Narcotic Drug 
Manufacturers, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-pharma-
20150828-story.html. 
 147.   See People v. Purdue Pharma LP., No. 2014-00725287, 2015 WL 5123273 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 27, 2015) (Order Granting Motion to Stay).  
 148.   See id. at *2. 
 149.   See id. 
 150.   See City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 14 C 4361, 2014 WL 7146362, at *9 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2014) (Memorandum Opinion and Order). 
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was influenced by a misrepresentation.151  The city filed a 300-page 
amended complaint in November 2015, keeping the suit alive.152 
2.  Settlements that Impose Obligations Exceeding FDA Requirements 
With the increased number of UDAP enforcement actions, AGs are 
forming multi-state groups and entering into settlements with 
pharmaceutical companies that impose new restrictions and obligations 
over the future marketing of prescription drugs.  These multi-state 
settlements have provided a new layer of state regulation on the 
marketing of prescription drugs by empowering AGs with the authority 
to enforce certain FDA regulations and impose additional restrictions 
above existing FDA regulations. 
The practice appears to have originated with the $58 million multi-
state Vioxx settlement in 2008.153  In the Vioxx settlement, Merck agreed 
to both refrain from making promotional claims, including oral 
statements by its sales representatives, that are false, misleading or 
deceptive, and to comply with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“FD&C Act”) as well as FDA requirements in connection with 
advertising and promotion.154  By agreeing to such terms, Merck 
effectively granted state AGs the power to enforce violations of FDA 
regulations—a power AGs do not have under the FD&C Act. 
The settlement also imposed new regulatory obligations on Merck.  
Merck agreed to “submit all new [Direct to Consumer] television 
advertising campaigns for any Merck Product to the FDA for pre-review, 
wait until Merck receives a response from FDA prior to running the 
advertising campaign, and to modify such advertising consistent with any 
written comments received from FDA.”155  The agreement prevented 
Merck from running any television ads marketing prescription drugs to 
consumers until it received a response from the FDA, no matter how 
                                                          
 151.   See City of Chicago, No. 14 C 4361, 2015 WL 2208423, at *15 (May 8, 2015) 
(Memorandum Opinion and Order). 
 152.   See Sindhu Sundar, Chicago Improves Opioid Case with Details About Doctors, LAW360 
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.law360.com/productliability/articles/731091. 
 153.   See Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, Or. Office of the Att’y Gen., AG Hardy Myers 
Files Judgment Against Merck; Oregon Is Lead State in $58 Million Settlement (May 20, 2008), 
http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/pages/2008/rel052008.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 
 154.   See Consent Judgment at 5–6, Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Merck & Co., No. CE 59178 (Iowa 
Dist. Ct. May 13, 2008) [hereinafter Merck Stip. Judgment], https://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/ 
media/cms/Vioxx_Consent_Judgment_2323D7AEA24ED.pdf.  
 155.   See id. at 6. 
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much time passed after submission.156  Through the settlement 
agreement, the AGs effectively switched a voluntary review procedure to 
a mandatory one, which is a power the FDA does not have due to 
potential First Amendment constraints.157 
Following the Vioxx settlement, a multi-state group of AGs entered 
into a similar settlement with Pfizer for $60 million related to its 
marketing of Celebrex and Bextra.158  As with the Vioxx settlement, the 
agreement included a provision that granted the AGs the power to 
enforce violations of FDA regulations, and it required that Pfizer submit 
all television advertising campaigns for any Pfizer prescripton drug or 
biological product to the FDA for pre-review.159  However, the 
agreement provided that in the event the FDA did not respond in 45 days 
Pfizer could run the advertisement after contacting the Multistate 
Executive Committee of AGs and informing them they have not received 
feedback from the FDA.160  This provided Pfizer with the ability to 
eventually run the advertisements in cases where the FDA did not 
respond, but it also provided the AGs an ability to monitor the 
promotional pieces as Pfizer was required to include all materials 
submitted to the FDA regarding its requested review with the notice to 
the AGs.161 
                                                          
 156.   See id. 
 157.   See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2012).  The agreement also imposed additional disclosure 
requirements for Continuing Medical Education presenters who have had a “promotional 
relationship” with Merck, and it imposed additional restraints on individuals who could serve on 
external Drug Safety Monitoring Boards that review Merck safety studies.  The requirements went 
beyond the usual financial conflicts and included items on vague potential biasing conflicts such as 
“intellectual conflict” or “career involvement” with the product under study.  Finally, the agreement 
imposed additional requirements for an individual to be identified as an author in a manuscript for a 
Merck-sponsored clinical trial.  To prevent the “ghostwriting” of journal articles, the agreement 
provided that the author of an article must have made “substantial contribution to the conception and 
design, or acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of data.”  Merck Stip. Judgment, supra 
note 154, at 6–10. 
 158.   See Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, Or. Office of the Att’y Gen., AG Myers Files 
Judgment Against Pfizer for $60 Million Concerning It’s Market of Drugs Celebrex & Bextra (Oct. 
22, 2008) [hereinafter Oregon AG Pfizer Press Release], http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/pages/ 
2008/rel102208.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2016).  The agreement also included disclosure 
requirements for CME speakers and it prevented the “[g]host writing” of articles and studies, 
“[u]sing ‘mentorships’ to pay physicians for time spent with Pfizer sales reps,” “[u]sing grants to 
encourage use of Pfizer products,” “[u]sing sales personnel to make grant decisions that are 
supposedly unrelated to . . . marketing,” and “[u]sing patient testimonials to misrepresent a drug’s 
efficacy.”  See id.; Stipulated General Judgment, at ¶ 15–16, 18, 29–30, Oregon ex rel. Myers v. 
Pfizer Inc., No. 08C23533 (Or. Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Pfizer Stip. Judgment], 
http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/pdf/pfizer_stip_judg_complaint.pdf. 
 159.   See Pfizer Stip. Judgment, supra note 158, at ¶ 8. 
 160.   See id. 
 161.   See id. 
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The agreement also sought to regulate possible off-label marketing, 
an area of focus in future multi-state settlements.  It prevented the use of 
samples to encourage off-label use.162  It also prohibited Pfizer from 
providing any incentives to its sales force for increasing the off-label use 
of a product, and it prohibited the distribution of articles and studies from 
scientific or medical journals (“reprints”) discussing off-label uses in a 
promotional manner.163  In addition, the agreement included specific 
guidelines on the appropriate use and required contents of reprints.164 
AGs expanded their off-label restrictions in a $100 million multi-
state settlement with Abbott regarding its marketing of Depakote in 
2012.165  The agreement specifically prohibited Abbott from promoting 
Depakote for off-label uses.166  It provided specific guidelines on how 
Abbott could respond to an unsolicited request by a physician about an 
off-label use.167  Sales personnel could only respond by informing the 
physician of the presence or absence of published studies concerning the 
off-label topic or acknowledging whether the topic is an area of research, 
and by offering to request on behalf of the physician that medical 
information be sent out as follow-up.168  The agreement also restricted 
the type of medical information such as reprints of articles that Abbott 
could distribute for these responses, and sales personnel were prevented 
from offering any opinions about or summarizing any off-label 
information.169  In addition, reprints containing information on an off-
label use could only be sent out by scientifically-trained personnel.170  
While many of these requirements are recommendations in the FDA 
Guidance Documents on responding to unsolicited requests for off-label 
                                                          
 162.   See id. at ¶ 27. 
 163.   See id. at ¶¶ 21–26; see also Oregon AG Pfizer Press Release, supra note 158. 
 164.   See Pfizer Stip. Judgment, supra note 158, at ¶¶ 23–24.  The agreement did provide Pfizer 
a mechanism to modify the off-label requirements regarding the use of reprints if the FDA were to 
issue final guidance documents that materially conflicted with the agreement.  See id. at ¶ 25. 
 165.   Press Release, Iowa Dep’t of Justice, Iowa Office of the Att’y Gen., Miller, State 
Attorneys General Reach $100 Million Settlement over Off-Label Marketing of Prescription Drug 
Depakote (May 7, 2012), https://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/newsroom/miller-state-attorneys-
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 166.   Consent Judgment at ¶ 4.2, State ex rel. Miller v. Abbott Labs., No. CE 71444 (Iowa Dist. 
Ct. May 7, 2012), https://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/media/cms/Abbott_consent_ 
398429BDF1CD9.pdf. 
 167.   Id. at ¶¶ 4.10–4.14. 
 168.   Id. at ¶¶ 4.13–4.14. 
 169.   Id. at ¶¶ 4.15–4.17. 
 170.   Id. at ¶ 4.17. 
2016 STATE AG ENFORCEMENT OF UDAP LAWS 235 
information171 and reprints,172 the restrictions on speech for sales 
personnel go beyond any FDA recommendation or requirement.173 
It appears unlikely that the FDA could enforce the restrictions on 
speech and the absolute prohibition on off-label promotion found in the 
Depakote settlement.  In United States v. Caronia, the Second Circuit 
held that the First Amendment prohibits the government from 
prosecuting a drug manufacturer or individual solely on the basis of 
truthful speech.174  The FDA subsequently attempted to limit the 
applicability of Caronia to the particular facts and circumstances of that 
case, but recently, a federal district court in New York held that the First 
Amendment precludes the government from using the FD&C Act to 
prohibit and criminalize truthful, non-misleading off-label speech.175  
The court rejected the FDA’s attempts to “marginalize the holding” in 
Caronia, and it declined to limit Caronia’s holding to only reactive 
statements made by non-sales personnel.176  It was the court’s 
“considered and firm view” that the FDA may not bring a misbranding 
action based on truthful non-misleading promotional speech alone.177 
With these multi-state UDAP settlement agreements, AGs have 
expanded their enforcement powers into the FDA’s realm and imposed 
regulatory demands on pharmaceutical manufacturers that go beyond the 
scope of the FDA’s authority and may violate the First Amendment.  
Creating additional burdens above FDA regulations may not improve 
                                                          
 171.   See FDA, Guidance for Industry: Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label 
Information About Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices (Draft Guidance) 6–12 (2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ 
ucm285145.pdf. 
 172.   See FDA, Guidance for Industry: Distributing Scientific and Medical Publications on 
Unapproved New Uses — Recommended Practices (Revised Draft Guidance) 7–17 (2014) 
[hereinafter FDA, Good Reprint Practices], 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm387
652.pdf. 
 173.   A similar multi-state settlement agreement was reached with Janssen/Johnson & Johnson 
for its alleged deceptive marketing of Risperdal.  The agreement prevented off-label promotion and 
restricted sales personnel’s ability to respond to unsolicited requests for information about off-label 
uses.  See Press Release, Vt. Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Sorrell Announces Johnson 
& Johnson to Pay Vermont $4.1 Million as Part of Landmark Settlement (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://ago.vermont.gov/focus/news/attorney-general-sorrell-announces-johnson-and-johnson-to-pay-
vermont-4.1-million-as-part-of-landmark-settlement.php; see also Final Judgment and Consent 
Decree at 8–14, State v. Janssen Pharm. Inc., No. 620-8-12 WNCV (Vt. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://ago.vermont.gov/assets/files/12%2008%2030%20Risperdal%20Final%20Judgment%20and%
20Consent%20Decree%20RKriger.pdf.   
 174.   703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 175.   See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 223–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 176.   See id. at 225. 
 177.   See id. at 224. 
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public health.  For instance, while the broad restrictions on the 
dissemination of off-label information contained in some of these 
agreements are focused on punishing a company and preventing them 
from profiting from proactive off-label promotion, they generally fail to 
consider the value that certain patient groups place on the distribution of 
such off-label information.  Off-label prescribing is common in medicine 
and it is often essential to giving patients optimal care.  Some patient 
groups, such as children and individuals with rare diseases, rely heavily 
on off-label prescriptions due to the difficulty of studying and obtaining 
an FDA approved indication for them.  In the area of oncology, it is 
estimated that between 50% and 75% of all cancer treatments are 
prescribed off-label,178 and in pediatrics, around 80% of the prescriptions 
are off-label.179 
The FDA has acknowledged that “the public health may benefit 
when health care professionals receive truthful and non-misleading 
scientific or medical publications on unapproved new uses[,]” and it 
“recognizes the value to health care professionals of truthful and non-
misleading scientific or medical publications on unapproved new 
uses.”180  Due to the complexity of the issues involved, the FDA has 
wrestled with trying to come up with the right balance for years.  It 
seems unlikely that the FDA’s mission is furthered by AGs restricting 
and penalizing pharmaceutical companies. 
3. Regulating Nursing Home Staffing 
AG use of UDAPs to regulate already-regulated industries extends to 
other businesses that comply with state and federal regulations.  As noted 
earlier, in Pennsylvania, then-AG Kathleen Kane brought an action 
against a group of skilled nursing facilities (SNF) over staffing levels 
under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Law (UTPCPL).181  She did so at the prompting of DC-based plaintiffs’ 
law firm Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, which used the state’s 
broad subpoena power to require the facilities to produce information on 
                                                          
 178. See Vicki W. Girard, Punishing Pharmaceutical Companies for Unlawful Promotion of 
Approved Drugs: Why the False Claims Act Is the Wrong Rx, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 119, 
131 (2009). 
 179.   See James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer 
Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 298 (2003). 
 180.   See FDA, GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 172, at 6. 
 181.   See Kat Greene, Nursing Home Operators Blast Pa. AG’s Hire of Cohen Milstein, 
LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/710002/nursing-home-operators-blast-pa-
ag-s-hire-of-cohen-milstein. 
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the number of residents and staffing of each facility182 even before filing 
suit on June 30, 2015.183  The targets of this litigation include a half 
dozen or more nursing home chains representing about “50% of the 
licensed beds in for-profit nursing homes in Pennsylvania.”184  The 
Commonwealth’s complaint seeks a civil penalty for each violation of 
the UTPCPL and, when the alleged violations involve individuals over 
65 years of age, the civil fine rises from $1,000 per violation to $3,000 
per violation.185 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Health (PA DOH) regulates staffing 
in SNFs.186  The PA DOH has adopted specific regulations governing 
nursing staff levels and the quality of care at SNFs.187  PA DOH 
regularly inspects SNFs to ensure that staffing regulations and care 
requirements are being met and is vested with the exclusive authority to 
bring actions or raise staffing levels where necessary.188  Pennsylvania 
law authorizes PA DOH to bring enforcement actions in the name of the 
Commonwealth for an injunction or other process restraining or 
prohibiting a healthcare provider from engaging in an activity in 
violation of the provisions of the Act or its implementing regulations.189  
In addition, PA DOH is the state agency responsible for ensuring that 
SNFs in Pennsylvania meet federal conditions for participation in both 
the Medicare and Medicaid programs.190  As part of this responsibility, 
PA DOH inspects each SNF at least annually and in response to 
complaints, and then must certify to the federal Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) that each SNF complies with the federal 
conditions for participation, including meeting federal staffing 
requirements.191 
The nursing facilities argued in Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, 
an intermediate appellate court, that the AG overstepped her authority by 
                                                          
 182.   See id. 
 183.   Complaint and Petition for Injunctive Relief, Commonwealth v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior 
Care LLC, No. 336 MD 2015 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 30, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint and Petition]. 
 184.   Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 87, at 5. 
 185.   Complaint and Petition, supra note 183, at 91. 
 186.   See Pa. Dep’t of Health, Health Facilities Licensing, PA.GOV, 
http://www.health.pa.gov/facilities/Licensees/Healthcare%20Facilities%20Licensing/Pages/default.a
spx#.V8cR8I-cHmI (last visited Oct. 7, 2016) (indicating that Pennsylvania’s Department of Health 
regulates Pennsylvania nursing home compliance with federal and state regulations). 
 187.   Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 87, at 13 (citing 28 PA. CODE §§ 201, 211 (2016)). 
 188.   See 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.813(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2014); 28 PA. 
CODE §§ 201.2, 211.12(l) (2016); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395aa, 1395i-3(g), 1396r(g) (2012). 
 189.   35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.817(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2014). 
 190.   See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395aa, 1395i-3g, 1396a, 1396r (2012); 55 PA. CODE § 1187.21 (2016). 
 191.   See supra note 190. 
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“attempt[ing] to impose new and unapproved staffing standards on SNFs 
without notice and comment” and challenged the AG’s authority to 
contract out enforcement power to private lawyers.192  In seeking a 
preliminary injunction against the state, the facilities stated that they 
expected the AG and the state’s outside counsel to seize upon general 
statements the facilities made about providing for the needs of nursing 
home residents to allege that they engaged in deceptive marketing 
practices under the UTPCPL.193  The facilities also stated that they 
anticipate that the AG would then attempt to use the UTPCPL to 
“establish a new minimum staffing requirement in Pennsylvania of 2.8 to 
3.2 hours of nursing aide staff per patient per day, which conflicts with 
PA DOH’s minimum staffing requirement of 2.7 hours of nursing care 
per resident per day.”194 
In January 2016, however, the Commonwealth Court ruled that the 
Pennsylvania AG’s office could use the state’s UDAP law to address 
advertisements or other representations about nursing home staffing 
levels, “whether in accord with those required by statute or regulation or 
not.”195 
4. Retroactively Defining Unfairness with Respect to Lending Practices 
As the history of UDAP laws shows, when Congress enacted the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, upon which state laws were based, 
legislators were concerned that the law should provide businesses with 
advance notice as to the types of conduct that is unfair or deceptive, 
particularly if they are to be subject to a civil penalty.196  An example 
involving the mortgage lending industry shows that, under UDAP laws, 
businesses may be exposed to UDAP liability even when a practice was 
permitted and widespread at the time, but later became viewed as unfair. 
In 2007, Massachusetts AG Martha Coakley brought an action 
against Fremont Investment & Loan alleging that its residential mortgage 
lending practices violated Massachusetts’ unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices statute, known as Chapter 93A.197  The AG argued that 
                                                          
 192.   Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 87, at 10. 
 193.   Id. at 16. 
 194.   See id. at 16–17 (citing 28 PA. CODE § 211.12(i) (2016)). 
 195.   See GGNSC Clarion LP v. Kane, No. 165 M.D. 2015, slip op. at 15–16 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
Jan. 11, 2016). 
 196.   See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 197.   See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BLS1, 2008 WL 517279, at *1 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008), modified in part, No. 07-4373-BLS1, 2008 WL 1913940 (Mar. 31, 
2008). 
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subprime loans were presumptively unfair and sought a preliminary 
injunction that would bar Fremont from foreclosing on certain loans 
originating between 2004 and 2007 without the written consent of the 
AG.198  Fremont opposed the preliminary injunction and argued that it 
had complied with all applicable laws and was truthful in all its 
representations to borrowers.199 
The trial court found no evidence that Fremont made any false 
representations to the borrowers about the terms of the loans or that 
Fremont knew of or should have known of any exaggeration of the 
borrower’s income.200  The court acknowledged that the loans did not 
violate any state or federal lending law, or industry standard, in effect at 
the time of origination.201  In fact, Fremont’s lending practices were 
typical of the industry.202  The trial court, nonetheless, held that 
Fremont’s subprime loans were presumptively structurally unfair under 
Massachusetts’ UDAP statute and granted the preliminary injunction.203  
It did so by applying the “spirit” of a separate statute applicable only to 
high-cost loans to all home loans.204 
The court reasoned that the concept of unfairness is not fixed in 
“stone” or “limited to conduct that is unlawful under the common law or 
prior statutes.”205  Rather, the court found that unfairness is “forever 
evolving” so as to “reflect what we have learned to be unfair from our 
experience.”206  “As the mortgage market changes, so, too, must the 
understanding of what lending conduct is unfair.”207 
The court recognized that the Fremont loans were not generally 
viewed as unfair at the time they originated.208  Yet, it justified its 
retrospective application of unfairness by finding that Fremont had fair 
warning about the dangers of subprime loans due to non-binding federal 
agency guidelines on subprime lending and high loan-to-value loans.209  
The rest of the industry, however, did not view such loans as improper.  
                                                          
 198.   See id. at *3. 
 199.   See id. at *1, 7. 
 200.   See id. at *7. 
 201.   See id. at *9. 
 202.   See id. (finding no “indication from the record that it was unusual for sub-prime lenders to 
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 203.   See id. at *14–15. 
 204.   See id. at *9–11. 
 205.   See id. at *12 (citing Kattar v. Demoulas, 739 N.E.2d 246, 256–57 (Mass. 2000)). 
 206.   See id. 
 207.   See id. at *11. 
 208.   See id. at *12. 
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And even as the court found that the legislature could not have 
“imagine[d]” the risk posed by subprime loans, legislators had access to 
many of the referenced guidance documents when it drafted the law that 
applied only high-cost loans.210 
After the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the trial 
court’s injunction,211 Fremont and the AG reached a $10 million 
settlement.212  The settlement included $8 million in consumer relief, $1 
million in civil penalties, and $1 million in costs, including attorneys’ 
fees.213  The agreement also secured an injunction affording state 
officials the opportunity to review any of Fremont’s 2,200 Massachusetts 
mortgages before the initiation of foreclosure proceedings even if the 
loan had been transferred to another holder.214 
C.  Aggregating “Per Violation” Civil Penalties 
UDAP laws provide a means for AGs to protect the rights of 
consumers by seeking injunctions to stop unfair or deceptive business 
practices before they cause harm and, where consumers have lost money, 
obtain restitution for them.  These laws also authorize AGs to request 
that a court punish companies that have violated the law and deter others 
from engaging in similar conduct by imposing civil penalties. 
In some states, all that an AG must show to establish a violation of a 
UDAP is that a business practice had the tendency to deceive or was 
capable of misleading someone.215  A violation may occur even if the 
business did not intend to deceive the public, consumers were not misled, 
and there was no actual loss.  Most UDAP laws allow the AG to seek, 
                                                          
 210.   See id. at *11. 
 211.   See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Mass. 2008). 
 212.   See Press Release, Mass. Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Martha Coakley 
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and the court to impose, a civil penalty for any violation of the act.  
About twenty state laws require evidence that a business knowingly, 
willfully, or intentionally engaged in a deceptive practice before 
imposing civil penalties,216 though in practice, this culpability 
requirement often receives little consideration. 
Civil penalties range from up to $1,000 to up to $50,000 per 
violation.217  About half of the states set the maximum civil penalty in 
the $1,000 to $5,000 range,218 an amount that can still reach an 
extraordinary sum when aggregated per violation.  About the same 
number of states have maximum penalties set at $10,000,219 or more.220  
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In addition, some states provide for higher civil penalties when a 
violation involves individuals who are elderly or disabled,221 and some 
provide for additional penalties for repeat offenders.222 
Most UDAP laws provide no guidance as to when a civil penalty 
should be on the smaller or larger end of the permissible range.  
Complaints often seek the maximum fine permitted under the law.  The 
arbitrariness of the amount of the civil penalty is compounded by how 
courts calculate the number of violations.  AGs often seek “per violation” 
civil penalties based on every prescription filled, letter sent, product sold, 
or advertisement published or aired for the longest period allowed under 
the statute of limitations.  As a result, businesses are exposed to 
extraordinary penalties for a single action even when the conduct did not 
mislead anyone or cause an economic loss. 
These problems do not arise under the FTC Act, the model for many 
UDAP laws.  Federal law authorizes the FTC to bring an action against a 
business that has engaged in deceptive practices and obtain a cease-and-
desist order.  The FTC can also require businesses that violate the FTC 
Act to provide consumers with refunds, pay damages, or provide other 
consumer redress.223  For example, a company accused of selling bogus 
weight loss pills and using fake celebrity endorsements recently agreed 
to pay $43 million to settle the FTC’s claims, which will go into a 
consumer redress fund.224 
In addition, the FTC can seek civil penalties of up to $16,000 per 
violation when a business violates a consent agreement (under which it 
agreed, without admitting liability, to stop a practice of concern to the 
Commission) or continues a practice after the Commission finds it is 
deceptive and issues a cease-and-desist order.225  The Commission may 
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also seek civil penalties from businesses that have not entered a consent 
agreement or received a cease-and-desist order if the FTC first provides 
that business with a copy of the Commission determination in a similar 
case finding the act or practice unfair or deceptive.226  The public policy 
underlying this process recognizes that “unfair” and “deceptive” are 
vague terms and that it is improper to punish a business without first 
giving it notice that its conduct violates the law.  Civil penalties, under 
federal law, are reserved for situations in which the violator had “actual 
knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is 
unlawful.”227 
There is no such process before an AG decides to bring an action 
under UDAP laws.  Rather, in nearly every state, the AG can 
immediately seek civil penalties, without first providing notice of a 
violation228 or seeking an injunction or other relief for consumers.229  As 
discussed earlier, when the state litigates through a contingency-fee 
arrangement, the private lawyers representing the state have an incentive 
to seek the maximum penalty in every case, regardless of whether such a 
fine is appropriate and in the public interest.  In addition, due to the lack 
of notice as to the legality of conduct under UDAPs, the unpredictability 
of the potential penalty, and the lack of proportionality in many cases 
between the size of the fine and the conduct or harm, these civil penalties 
raise serious constitutional concerns.230  They are ripe for challenge 
under the Due Process Clause and Excessive Fines Clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution and similar state constitutional safeguards.231 
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1. Multi-Million Dollar Civil Penalty Without Deception or Harm in 
South Carolina 
The previously discussed South Carolina case against Janssen for its 
marketing of Risperdal provides an example of the arbitrariness in how 
civil penalties can be calculated.  It also illustrates the level of exposure 
companies can face when the aggregation of “per violation” penalties are 
combined with a low standard of proof.232  Under the South Carolina 
Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA), the AG is authorized to seek up 
to $5,000 per violation upon a showing that the party knew or should 
have known that the conduct was unlawful.233  The AG is not required to 
prove that the company’s statements were made with an intent to 
deceive, caused anyone any injury, or that anyone relied on these 
statements to impose a civil penalty, but only that the statements at issue 
have a “tendency to deceive.”234 
The state, litigating through outside counsel, made two distinct 
claims under SCUTPA—(1) the Risperdal labeling itself was unfair and 
misleading because it did not include sufficient information on the risks 
associated with the drug; and (2) the dear doctor letter sent by the 
company to doctors about the drug was misleading.  In making these 
claims, the AG relied on the previously discussed April 2004 FDA 
warning letter, which concluded that the dear doctor letter did not 
properly disclose the risks of hyperglycemia and diabetes associated with 
the drug.235  In response, the manufacturer sent a corrective letter to 
doctors acknowledging the omission.236 
The trial court accepted the state’s argument that the distribution to 
physicians of each sample box containing the allegedly deceptive 
labeling, each dear doctor letter, and each follow-up sales call after the 
dear doctor letter constituted a separate SCUTPA violation.237  The trial 
court imposed a $300 civil penalty for each of 509,499 Risperdal sample 
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boxes distributed in the state between 1998 and the date the lawsuit was 
filed on April 23, 2007 ($152.8 million).238  It also imposed a $4,000 
civil penalty for each of 7,184 dear doctor letters sent to physicians in the 
state ($28.7 million) and each of 36,372 follow-up sales calls made to 
doctors ($145.5 million).239  The total civil penalty was reportedly the 
largest imposed under SCUTPA in state history.240 
The South Carolina Supreme Court found the “per box” and “per 
sales call” civil penalty amounts excessive.  It reduced these fines from 
$300 to $100 and $4,000 to $2,000, respectively, but offered little 
explanation for why its substituted amounts were reasonable, but the trial 
court’s amounts were not.241  The court did not reduce the $4,000 penalty 
for each dear doctor letter, calling the question of whether this fine is 
excessive a “close” one.242 
In future cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court directed trial 
courts to consider a list of non-exclusive factors when assessing civil 
penalties under SCUTPA.  These factors include: 
(1) the degree of culpability and good or bad faith of the defendant; (2) 
the duration of the defendant’s unlawful conduct; (3) active 
concealment of information by the defendant; (4) defendant’s 
awareness of the unfair or deceptive nature of their conduct; (5) prior 
similar conduct by the defendant; (6) the defendant’s ability to pay; (7) 
the deterrence value of the assessed penalties; and (8) the actual impact 
or injury to the public resulting from defendant’s unlawful conduct.243 
The court, however, did not discuss in depth how it weighed these 
factors to arrive at what it deemed to be a non-excessive fine. 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the manufacturer, in an effort to 
increase sales, had given misleading information to doctors, warranting 
civil penalties.244  But the court acknowledged that the manufacturer’s 
conduct “likely had little impact on the community of prescribing 
physicians.”245  The court recognized an “absence of significant actual 
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harm” to the public.246  It also found the trial court improperly included 
sample boxes that were outside the statute of limitations and reduced the 
violations for the sample boxes from 509,499 to 228,447.247 
As a result, the South Carolina Supreme Court reduced the total 
combined civil penalty from $327 million to $124 million, declaring that 
by doing so it had resolved any due process concerns and the penalties 
were not excessive under the prohibition of excessive fines under the 
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.248  The civil penalty 
imposed by South Carolina, however, was twenty-five times greater than 
the average state award under the settlement agreement with thirty-six 
states and the District of Columbia to resolve their UDAP claims 
regarding Risperdal marketing.249  The U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari250 of an appeal raising the questions of whether a $124 million 
civil penalty, without any showing of actual deception, reliance, or 
injury, violates the Excessive Fines Clause.251 
2. “Slash and Burn” Tactics in Mississippi Action 
In a similar action, Mississippi AG Jim Hood, working with 
plaintiffs’ law firms (one of which was located in Texas but donated 
$75,000 to his campaign),252 filed an action against Eli Lilly related to its 
marketing of Zyprexa, a drug in the same class as Risperdal, known as 
atypical antipsychotic drugs.  While the FDA approved Zyprexa for 
treating serious psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder, the lawsuit alleged the company marketed it for unapproved 
uses and that it did not fully disclose potential risks, such as weight gain 
and diabetes.  Nearly all other states had settled its claims with the drug 
maker by 2009, except Mississippi.253 
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The Mississippi Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) authorizes a civil 
penalty of up to $10,000 for each knowing and willful violation.254  AG 
Hood requested that the court apply this maximum amount to each of 
almost one million estimated Zyprexa prescriptions in Mississippi.255  
Attorneys for the state took the position that Mississippi was entitled to 
this amount without the need to show proof of reliance or causation, and 
irrespective of any costs or damages borne by the state.256 
In December 2009, Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Mississippi’s claim 
for statutory penalties under the MCPA, as well as all of the state’s other 
claims but one.  Judge Weinstein found that in order to appropriately 
assess a civil penalty, he would need more information about each 
prescription filled, such as whether it was for an approved or off-label 
use, whether the patient benefited from the medicine, and whether the 
patient experienced any of the potential side effects at issue.257  The state, 
however, had not offered such individual information, leading the court 
to find it impossible to fairly exercise its discretion to impose appropriate 
penalties.  This type of assessment, Judge Weinstein added, would be 
beyond the resources of the court, given the individualized inquiry 
needed for hundreds of thousands of claimed violations.258 
On the other hand, Judge Weinstein found that Lilly had “created a 
product with substantial benefits that even now—after many years of 
litigation, research, testing, and controversy—is still favored by many 
physicians and patients in Mississippi and elsewhere for some of the 
most serious psychological conditions that afflict millions of people 
worldwide.”259 
Judge Weinstein also recognized “serious constitutional . . . 
questions” with the scale of recovery sought by Mississippi.260  He found 
that “Mississippi’s requests for statutory penalties on a per-violation 
basis, in addition to actual damages sought, would result in a multibillion 
dollar cumulative penalty grossly disproportionate to both the injury 
Mississippi ha[d] suffered and the seriousness of Lilly’s alleged 
misconduct.”261  These types of claims, which aggregate civil penalties 
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on a per violation basis, “could result in serious harm or bankruptcy for 
this defendant and the pharmaceutical industry generally.”262  Judge 
Weinstein concluded: 
For the legal system to be used for this slash-and-burn-style of 
litigation would arguably constitute an abuse of the legal process.  
Constitutional, statutory, and common law rights of those injured to 
seek relief from the courts must be recognized.  But courts cannot be 
used as an engine of an industry’s unnecessary destruction.263 
Just two months after Judge Weinstein’s ruling, Mississippi agreed 
to an $18.5 million settlement of which $3.7 million went to the state’s 
outside counsel.264 
3. The “Pile on Effect” 
As atypical antipsychotic drug litigation shows, it is commonplace 
for businesses to face similar UDAP enforcement actions from multiple 
states or a coordinated multi-state AG action.  Consumer class actions, 
sometimes brought by the same private lawyers who sue on behalf of 
state AGs, may seek treble damages and attorneys’ fees.  Individual 
lawsuits stemming from the same conduct may seek actual damages, 
statutory damages, and punitive damages.  Businesses may also face 
claims brought by the federal government.  The potential liability 
exposure for a single course of conduct is staggering. 
For example, in litigation alleging Lilly improperly marketed 
Zyprexa discussed above, the pharmaceutical maker agreed to a $62 
million multi-state settlement with thirty-three state AGs to resolve 
UDAP claims.265  It then settled individually with the state AGs of 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, 
South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia for roughly $196 million.266  
Lilly also settled the DOJ’s off-label marketing allegations for $1.415 
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billion,267 and settled roughly 26,000 individual products liability suits 
for $1.2 billion.268  In addition, Lilly faced a class action brought on 
behalf of third-party payor institutional plaintiffs, including pension 
funds, labor unions, and insurance companies that made outlays for 
Zyprexa prescriptions as well as several shareholder derivative 
actions.269 
This form of cumulative litigation is not isolated to the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Toyota faced a similar set of lawsuits in the 
unintended acceleration litigation.  Toyota agreed to a $29 million 
settlement with thirty state AGs to resolve UDAP claims,270 plus another 
$16 million to settle UDAP claims brought by the Orange County, 
California District Attorney.271  The issue also generated a consumer 
class action lawsuit seeking economic losses on behalf of all vehicle 
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owners, which Toyota settled for an estimated $1.1 billion.272  In 
addition, the automaker paid a $1.2 billion penalty to the federal 
government,273 settled a shareholder class action for $25.5 million,274 and 
settled around 340 personal injury/wrongful death suits for an 
undisclosed sum.275 
Courts have recognized that punishing a business repeatedly for the 
same conduct raises significant constitutional concerns.276  None have 
yet addressed whether civil penalties imposed under UDAPs when 
combined with other government penalties and punitive damages in 
private lawsuits, or settlements of actions that contain a punitive element, 
cross this threshold. 
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D. Allocating Settlement Money to Unrelated Projects and Handpicked 
Organizations 
States vary in how they treat funds collected as a result of an 
enforcement action targeting unfair or deceptive business practices.  
These amounts can be substantial—in the tens or hundreds of millions of 
dollars—as the prior section shows. 
Many state laws either do not expressly address the use of money 
recovered through UDAP litigation or provide AGs and other officials 
with wide discretion as to how they spend funds received as a result of 
litigation.  When consumer protection funds accumulate large balances, 
tension can result between AGs and legislatures eying the funds as a 
source of money for other pressing state needs or to fill budget gaps.277  
In some states, government auditors have identified a lack of proper 
controls in the operation and use of the recovered funds.278  In addition, 
some AGs have allocated money from UDAP settlements and judgments 
to outside organizations or causes that have little or no connection to the 
litigation or to addressing the type of conduct that spurred the lawsuit or 
any harm that occurred.  Critics of this type of spending have charged 
that AGs inappropriately use the state’s recovery to support their 
reelection prospects or advancement to higher office, rather than for 
consumer interests.279 
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For example, Arkansas AG Dustin McDaniel allocated $425,000 of 
the state’s $21 million share of a multistate settlement targeting health 
claims made with respect to Dannon’s Activia and DanActive products 
to three local hunger relief organizations.280  Some criticized this action 
as “trying to buy some votes,”281 while others insinuated nepotism was at 
play.282  In a separate instance, McDaniel, a former police officer, 
announced that he would donate $700,000 of settlement money his office 
received as a result of a multi-state UDAP action against two 
pharmaceutical makers to the Arkansas State Police Foundation.283  
Money received as a result of the lawsuit, which alleged the 
manufacturers violated drug manufacturing standards, would be used to 
build a new training facility at a police shooting range.284 
In California, half of the $16 million settlement from Orange 
County’s UDAP settlement with Toyota over sudden unintended 
acceleration claims went to fund county programs to address gang 
violence.285  Of the remaining $8 million, $4 million was allocated to pay 
for the costs of the lawsuit, including the fees of outside counsel, and $4 
million was retained by Orange County District Attorney Tony 
Rackauckas’s office to “fight economic crime.”286  The District Attorney 
then came under fire from the Orange County Board of Supervisors, 
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content/uploads/2011/06/cypresnet.pdf (noting McDaniel’s wife served at the time on the board of 
one of the organizations). 
 283.   Ark. Att’y Gen. Dustin McDaniel, Remarks to the Arkansas State Police Foundation (July 
1, 2011), http://www.arktimes.com/images/blogimages/2011/07/12/1310497541-
mcdanielspeech.pdf.  McDaniel stated that he would rather donate the money to a good cause than 
“fill budget holes for legislators.”  Id. 
 284.   Editorial, Show Us the Money, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/show-us-the-money/Content?oid=1951442. 
 285.   Tony Saavedra, Toyota Settles with O.C. D.A. for $16 Million, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Aug. 
21, 2013), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/toyota-502946-rackauckas-acceleration.html. 
 286.   David McAfee, Toyota Pays $16M to Settle Calif. DA’s Acceleration Suit, LAW360 (Apr. 
5, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/430817/toyota-pays-16m-to-settle-calif-da-s-acceleration-
suit. 
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whose members were frustrated that none of the settlement funds came 
back to the county’s discretionary budget.287 
Michigan AG Mike Cox announced that he would use $500,000 of 
the state’s settlement with Countrywide Financial Group over mortgage 
foreclosure practices to fund two Grand Rapids-area parks.288  The AG 
viewed park improvements as helping to stabilize property values in 
urban areas, while critics viewed the allocation of state funds as a way to 
gain support for a run for governor.289  He then redirected the money to 
United Way.290  While the bulk of the settlement, $6.6 million of the $9.9 
million total, would be distributed to 3,700 former Countrywide 
customers who would receive about $1,800 each,291 some local and state 
leaders felt the remaining funds could have been better spent to help 
families who lost their homes to foreclosure.292 
Kentucky AG Jack Conway distributed $32 million of a UDAP 
settlement with two pharmaceutical manufacturers to an array of drug 
treatment programs.293  The lawsuits, however, did not address substance 
                                                          
 287.   Erika Aguilar, DA’s Office Comes up Short in Orange County Budget, 89.3 KPCC (May 
13, 2015), http://www.scpr.org/news/2015/05/13/51656/orange-county-budget-battle-to-watch-is-
over-d-a-s/. 
 288.   See Emily Zoladz, Countrywide Money for Parks Draws Criticism; Secchia Defends 
Millennium Donation Because of its Urban Location, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Mar. 18, 2009), 
http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/news_impact/print.html?entry=/2009/03/countrywide_money_for_par
ks_dr.html. 
 289.   See Jim Harger, Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox Says He’s “Dumbfounded” that 
Grand Rapids, Kent County Leaders Are Questioning $500,000 in Local Park Donations, GRAND 
RAPIDS PRESS (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-
rapids/index.ssf/2009/03/michigan_attorney_general_mike.html (reporting that critics charged that 
Cox, who was considering a run for Governor, distributed the money to further his political 
ambitions); Jim Harger, State, Local Legislators Call for Reevaluation of Countrywide Mortgage 
Settlement Funds After Surprise Parks Money, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Mar. 19, 2009), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2009/03/state_local_legislators_call_f.html 
(reporting Democrats charged, however, that Cox decided to give the money to the parks after being 
approached by a major GOP donor who also heads fundraising for one of the county-owned parks). 
 290.   Beth Loechler, Attorney General Mike Cox Changes Plan for Foreclosure Settlement 
Money, Shifts $500,000 from Parks to United Way, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Mar. 22, 2009), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2009/03/attorney_general_mike_cox_chan.html. 
 291.   See Press Release, Mich. Office of the Att’y Gen., Countrywide Financial to Pay $6.6 
Million to 3,674 Michigan Borrowers (undated), http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,1607,7-164-46849-
218726—,00.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 
 292.   Zoladz, supra note 288. 
 293.   AG Jack Conway announced that the settlement would be divided as follows: $19 million 
to start a grant program to finance juvenile abuse treatment programs; $6 million to administer the 
state’s electronic prescription drug monitoring program; $2.52 million for scholarships to seek 
treatment at the state’s Recovery Kentucky Centers; $1.5 million to the University of Kentucky to 
assist treatment providers; $1 million to support drug programs for pregnant women; $1 million for a 
school-based substance abuse screening tool with the state Department of Education; $560,000 to 
help create 14 drug-free homes for people making the transition out of residential drug treatment 
programs; $500,000 to complete construction of a treatment center in Ashland, Kentucky; and 
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abuse.  They alleged that manufacturers violated the Kentucky Consumer 
Protection Act by failing to disclose cardiovascular risks associated with 
Vioxx and Avandia.294  One legislative leader did not object to how the 
money was going to be used, but questioned the legality of the 
arrangement since he believed Kentucky law requires depositing 
settlement money in the General Fund and appropriation by the 
legislature.295 
Some state AGs have claimed that the power to decide how 
settlement money is spent is within his or her sole discretion, to the ire of 
lawmakers.  For example, in February 2015, the U.S. Department of 
Justice announced a $1.375 billion settlement on behalf of the federal 
government, nineteen states, and the District of Columbia with Standard 
& Poors Financial Services LLC, along with its parent corporation 
McGraw Hill Financial, Inc., to resolve allegations involving how it 
issued ratings for residential mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations.296  Maine’s claims, brought under its 
UDAP law, gained the state a $21.5 million share of the settlement, 
which AG Janet Mills described “as the largest ever one-time court 
settlement in the [state’s] history.”297  Maine Governor Paul LePage 
challenged the AG’s authority to unilaterally allocate state funds, noting 
that the power to appropriate revenue is constitutionally given to the 
legislature checked by the Executive.298 
These practices are not only politically controversial, but can lead to 
legal and fiscal problems for the state.  The principal example is West 
Virginia AG McGraw’s use of funds collected as a result of settlements 
                                                          
$250,000 to create a database to evaluate the outcomes of juvenile treatment.  Press Release, Ky. 
Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Conway Announces $32 Million for Drug Addiction 
Treatment (Jan. 6, 2014), http://migration.kentucky.gov/newsroom/ag/drugaddictiontreatment.htm. 
 294.   Id. 
 295.   Ronnie Ellis, Drug Settlement Funds to Benefit Recovery Centers, GLASGOW DAILY 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.glasgowdailytimes.com/news/local_news/drug-settlement-funds-
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with two pharmaceutical manufacturers, Dey Inc. and Purdue Pharma.299  
In both of the underlying lawsuits, AG McGraw claimed that the 
manufacturers’ marketing practice resulted in losses for the state’s 
Medicaid program.300  AG McGraw allocated most of the $850,000 Dey 
settlement money to the Public Employees Insurance Agency, retaining 
$100,000 for his office’s consumer protection fund.301  He distributed the 
$10 million Purdue settlement, which resolved allegations that the 
company misrepresented the potential for addiction to OxyContin, more 
broadly: “$500,000 to the University of Charleston for a pharmacy 
school[,]”302 $180,000 for a nursing program run by the wife of the State 
Senate president,303 and an unknown amount to help pay for a 12,000-
foot fitness training center for a West Virginia State Police Academy 
center,304 in addition to funding substance abuse and other programs.305  
The outside counsel hired to litigate the West Virginia case earned more 
than $3 million.306  The state agencies in whose name McGraw sued 
received virtually none of the settlement, and the federal government, 
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http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510525600-w-va-ag-might-be-done-appealing-3-1m-disputes-with-
feds. 
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which funds a substantial portion of the state’s Medicaid program, 
received nothing from both of these settlements.307 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) withheld 
from West Virginia’s Department of Health and Human Resources 
$446,607 for the Dey settlement308 and $2,732,968 for the Purdue 
settlement.309  HHS claimed it was owed these amounts since West 
Virginia did not reimburse HHS for its share in the Medicaid 
overpayments or inform HHS about these settlements.310  McGraw filed 
suit against HHS, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
held that a “[s]traightforward application of the Medicaid Act” shows 
that HHS had the right to withhold the settlement amount in Medicaid 
funds from the state.311 
Following this controversy, McGraw lost his reelection bid to West 
Virginia AG Patrick Morrisey, who during the campaign promised to 
reform the office.  As promised, the new AG instituted a number of 
reforms, including a competitive bidding process and caps on 
contingency fees for outside attorneys.312  He also worked with the 
governor and legislature to turn over a portion of settlement funds above 
that needed for the operation of his office’s consumer protection division 
to the state’s General Fund.313  For example, in 2013, the West Virginia 
legislature, with the support of AG Morrisey, reallocated $7.5 million of 
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the unappropriated surplus balance in the Consumer Protection Recovery 
Fund to the State Fund, General Revenue.314 
IV. LEFT UNCHECKED, THESE PRACTICES WILL EXPAND 
While many examples of AG enforcement of UDAP laws explored 
in this Article involve the pharmaceutical industry, a broad range of 
businesses are bracing themselves for similar actions. 
The types of practices discussed in this Article apply to any industry.  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have become prime targets because they 
are viewed as deep pockets by private lawyers who have partnered with 
state AGs.  Given the success of this model in leading to lucrative 
settlements, these types of enforcement practices are likely to expand to 
new industries and types of conduct.  As noted earlier, some of these 
practices have already arisen in cases involving nursing homes, mortgage 
lenders, and automobile manufacturers, among others. 
For example, two areas where expanded AG use of UDAP 
enforcement actions appears particularly likely with significant potential 
for misuse of these laws are data breaches and food marketing practices. 
After a data breach, companies are often accused of having failed to 
adequately protect their customers’ information.  Historically, the FTC 
has taken the lead in privacy law enforcement.  Now, with increased 
storage of consumer data and a rise in security breaches, state AGs and 
class action lawyers are increasingly bringing actions under state UDAP 
laws and other legal theories.  Many states have adopted statutes that 
specifically empower AGs to use their UDAP authority to enforce data 
security breach notification requirements.315  AGs have used these laws 
to impose penalties on companies when a data breach occurs, whether it 
results from an individual employee’s carelessness or a malicious hacker.  
For instance, Health Net settled claims with then-Connecticut AG 
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Richard Blumenthal in 2010316 and Vermont AG William Sorrell in 
2011317 after the insurer lost a hard drive that included protected health 
information.  There was no indication that anyone had actually accessed 
the information. 
Massachusetts AG Martha Coakley entered a similar settlement in 
2011 with a company that owns several popular bars and restaurants in 
the Boston area.  In that instance, malcode installed on The Briar 
Group’s computer systems allowed hackers access to customers’ credit 
card and debit card information.318  The complaint alleged the business 
violated the state’s UDAP law by failing to adequately protect their 
customers’ personal information.319  Under the terms of the settlement, 
the company must adopt additional security measures and investigate any 
potential misuse of the stolen data and alert customers if there is 
evidence of fraudulent transactions.320  The company also agreed to pay 
the state $110,000 in civil penalties.321 
Thus far, AG actions have been measured responses to data breaches 
compared to consumer class actions, which have sought substantial 
damages even in absence of evidence of misuse.  Private class actions 
have faced significant legal challenges, such as the need to show an 
actual injury.322  Should an AG empower a private lawyer to seek civil 
                                                          
 316.   Press Release, Conn. Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Announces Health Net 
Settlement Involving Massive Security Breach Compromising Private Medical and Financial Info 
(July 6, 2010), http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2341&Q=462754.  In addition to spending 
millions of dollars to provide private identity theft protection to individuals whose information was 
included on the hard drive, Health Net paid Connecticut $250,000.  See id.  The settlement also 
provided for Health Net to pay an additional $500,000 if evidence established that the lost drive was 
accessed and personal information used illegally.  See id.  The Connecticut settlement was hailed by 
Blumenthal as the “first of its kind in the nation.”  Id. 
 317.   Consent Decree, Final Order and Judgment, Vermont v. Health Net, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-
0016 (D. Vt. Jan. 20, 2011), http://ago.vermont.gov/assets/files/Health%20Net%20Proposed% 
20Settlement.pdf (agreeing to pay state $55,000); see also Press Release, Vt. Office of the Att’y 
Gen., Attorney General Settles Security Breach Allegations Against Health Insurer (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://ago.vermont.gov/focus/news/attorney-general-settles-security-breach-allegations-against-
health-insurer.php. 
 318.  Final Judgment by Consent, Commonwealth v. Briar Group, LLC, Civ. No. 11‐1185B, 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2011), http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/uploads/file/Briar%20Group% 
20Judgment%203_28_11.pdf; see also Press Release, Mass. Office of the Att’y Gen., Major Boston 
Restaurant Group that Failed to Secure Personal Data to Pay $110,000 Under Settlement with AG 
Coakley (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2011/ 
restaurant-group-pay-110000-under-ag-settlement.html. 
 319.   Final Judgement by Consent, supra note 318, at 2. 
 320.   Id. at 3–5. 
 321.   Id. at 5. 
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penalties on behalf of the state after a data breach, the aggregation of 
penalties based on each person whose data was potentially exposed, even 
if there is no evidence that it was actually misused, could result in 
extraordinary liability. 
Another potential target for UDAP enforcement actions is the food 
industry.  Private lawyers have circulated a pitch to state AGs suggesting 
that the state hire them to bring lawsuits against food manufacturers and 
restaurant chains to hold them financially responsible for medical costs 
associated with obesity-related conditions.323  The letter suggested that 
AGs delegate the state’s subpoena power under UDAP laws to private 
lawyers.  They would use the state’s power to attempt to find internal 
documents that could tarnish the public’s perception of food makers324 
and place targeted “Big Food defendants” at a distinct disadvantage even 
before filing suit.325  An investigation by Politico revealed that the law 
firm behind the proposal had circulated it to AGs in at least sixteen 
states.326 
To date, no AG has taken the bait on that proposal, possibly as a 
result of public disclosure of the lawyers’ marketing effort.  In recent 
years, however, plaintiffs’ attorneys, relying on UDAP laws, have filed a 
surge of consumer class actions challenging food marketing practices.327  
The most popular style of these claims alleges that a product is 
misleadingly advertised as “natural” due to its processing or the presence 
of genetically-modified or other ingredients.328 
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As their pitch to AGs to bring obesity-related litigation shows, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers certainly are aware that bringing UDAP actions 
through state AGs, rather than as private class actions, can avoid 
challenges they face in such suits, such as showing consumers were 
actually injured by allegedly deceptive marketing and what, if any, loss 
consumers incurred.  Instead, a state AG enforcement action would allow 
for significant civil penalties for each product sold. 
AGs have already brought UDAP actions against food makers.  As 
discussed earlier, thirty-nine AGs joined the FTC in a settlement with 
Dannon of claims alleging that the company exaggerated the health 
benefits of its Activia yogurt and its DanActive dairy drink.329  Time will 
tell whether AGs are willing to move from cases against food companies 
involving claimed nutritional benefits or health risks to partnering with 
private lawyers to bring the types of claims that are more common in 
class action litigation. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Courts and legislatures can address the issues raised in this Article 
while fully preserving the ability of state AGs to stop deceptive practices, 
obtain restitution for any consumer who suffered a loss, and impose civil 
penalties on those who willfully violate the law.  They can do so by 
providing transparency in state hiring of outside counsel, fostering 
consistency between UDAP litigation and a business’s compliance with 
government regulations, and curtailing the potential for excessive civil 
penalties.  They can also ensure that UDAP actions are not viewed as a 
means to create a slush fund for AGs, particularly given ever tightening 
state budgets. 
A.  Provide Transparency in the State’s Hiring and Payment of Outside 
Counsel and Require Government Control over Litigation 
In order to address concern with state retention of private attorneys 
on a contingency-fee basis, fifteen state legislatures have adopted 
safeguards that apply when an AG or other state official retains outside 
                                                          
 329.   See Press Release, FTC, Dannon Agrees to Drop Exaggerated Health Claims for Activia 
Yogurt and DanActive Dairy Drink (Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
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counsel to represent the state since 2010.330  While the specific 
provisions of these laws vary from state to state, common provisions 
include (1) requiring government officials who have authority to hire 
outside counsel to make a written finding that hiring outside counsel is 
cost-effective and in the public interest before hiring private lawyers; (2) 
subjecting the hiring process to competitive public bidding; (3) posting 
contingency-fee contracts and payments made to private lawyers on a 
public website; (4) requiring outside counsel to maintain detailed time 
and expense records; (5) mandating that government lawyers maintain 
control over the litigation; (6) placing with the state exclusive authority 
to settle a case; (7) adopting a sliding scale for contingency-fees based on 
the amount recovered, along with a maximum fee cap; and (8) precluding 
lawyers from collecting fees based on a percentage of the civil penalties 
imposed. 
Some states, such as Louisiana, Nevada, and New Hampshire, go 
further to protect the legislature’s appropriation authority by requiring 
the AG to obtain legislative approval before retaining an attorney on a 
contingency-fee basis.331  For instance, Louisiana enacted a law in 2014 
that codified a Louisiana Supreme Court decision finding that the state 
AG or a state agency may not hire outside counsel on a contingency-fee 
basis unless specifically authorized by the legislature.332  The law also 
prohibits outside counsel from demanding that defendants or any other 
third party pay them for representing the state.333  While requiring the 
AG to obtain approval from the legislature prior to hiring on a 
                                                          
 330.   See ALA. CODE § 41-16-72 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-4801 et seq. (Supp. 
2015); 2015 Ark. Act 851 (S.B. 204) (2015) (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-16-714); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 16.0155 (West 2014); 2011 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 101-2011 (S.E.A. 214) (2011) (to be 
codified at IND. CODE § 4-6-3-2.5); IOWA CODE ANN. § 23B.1 et seq. (West Supp. 2014); 2014 La. 
Sess. Law Serv. 796  (2014) (H.B. 799) (amending LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:262, 49:259); MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 7-5-5, 7-5-8, 7-5-21, 7-5-39 (Supp. 2013); 2011 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 59 (2011) (amending 
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 34.376 et seq.); 2015 Nev. Laws Ch. 85 (S.B. 244) (2015) (to be codified in 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 228.110(2)); 2014 N.C. Laws S.L. 2014-110 (S.B. 648) (2014) (amending N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 114-9.2 et seq.); 2015 Ohio Laws 6 (S.B. 38) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.49 et seq.); 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 362 (S.B. 233) (2015) (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN.§ 67-
5-33); 2016 W. Va. Legis. Serv. Ch. 27 (H.B. 4007) (amending W. VA. CODE §§ 5-3-3, 5-3-4); 2013 
Wisc. Legis. Serv. Act 105 (A.B. 27) (amending WIS. STAT. §§ 14.11, 20.9305). 
 331.   See 2014 La. Sess. Law Serv. 796 (H.B. 799) (amending LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:262, 
49:259); 2015 Nev. Laws Ch. 85 (S.B. 244) (to be codified in NEV. REV. STAT. § 228.110(2)); Order 
Granting Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, State v. Actavis Pharma, Inc., No. 217-2015-CV-
00566 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2016) (interpreting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:12 (2013), 
https://cei.org/sites/default/files/NH%20court%20ruling%20on%20contingency%20fee%20contract
s.pdf. 
 332.   2014 La. Sess. Law Serv. 796 (H.B. 799) (amending LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:262, 49:259); 
see also Meredith v. Ieyoub, 700 So. 2d 478, 484 (La. 1997). 
 333.   2014 La. Sess. Law Serv. 796 (H.B. 799) (amending LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:262, 49:259). 
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contingency-fee basis might not be politically feasible in some states, 
state legislatures should at a minimum establish transparency 
requirements along with a competitive bidding process. 
In addition, courts have a significant role in ensuring that UDAP 
actions brought by states through outside counsel are litigated to advance 
the public, not private, interest.  Courts should carefully evaluate whether 
existing state law authorizes an AG to retain outside counsel on a 
contingency-fee basis.  When such arrangements are proper, courts 
should require government control over the litigation “with teeth.”  
Courts should not take boilerplate statements in the retention agreement 
placing control with the government at face value, but evaluate the 
state’s involvement in shaping the investigation, complaint, litigation 
strategy, any trial, and settlement.  If the government has, in practice, 
ceded its enforcement authority to private lawyers, then the court should 
not hesitate to find a due process violation, especially when the action 
seeks civil penalties. 
B. Foster Consistency Between UDAP Actions and Government 
Regulation 
States can also interpret their UDAP laws consistently with 
regulatory policy, and recognize that businesses that comply with 
regulatory obligations should not be subject to unpredictable and 
inconsistent liability.  In states lacking a provision recognizing the 
interaction between UDAP enforcement and activities already regulated 
by government agencies, state legislatures should consider adopting a 
law similar to most other states.  Such a law might clarify that the UDAP 
statute does not apply to “acts or practices permitted under laws of this 
State or the United States or under rules, regulations, or decisions 
interpreting such laws.” 
In states with such provisions, but where courts have interpreted 
them in a manner inconsistent with their purpose, state legislatures can 
amend the law as needed to preclude UDAP liability when the conduct at 
issue was permitted by government regulators or the product’s labeling 
or marketing was specifically approved by an agency charged with 
safeguarding the public. 
For their part, courts can find that conduct that complied with 
government regulations or was approved by a government agency is not 
unfair or deceptive as a matter of law, even if the state does not have a 
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codified regulatory compliance provision.334  They can recognize that 
conduct that is already comprehensively regulated by federal or state law 
to protect the public does not fall under the scope of a more general 
UDAP law.335  Courts can also find that warning letters and other 
informal correspondence issued by staff at regulatory agencies without 
any hearing or right to appeal are more prejudicial than probative in 
UDAP litigation,336 and do not fall within a recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule.337 
C. Establish Predictability and Proportionality in Civil Penalties 
As discussed earlier, in order to establish a UDAP violation, some 
states only require that the alleged misrepresentation had the tendency to 
deceive or was capable of misleading someone regardless as to whether 
the defendant intended to mislead.  Such a low standard of proof may be 
appropriate in cases where an AG is pursuing an injunction to prevent 
future harm, but it is improper when an AG is seeking to punish a 
company with civil penalties.  Fault has been a predicate throughout the 
history of liability law, and an AG should be required to establish some 
degree of culpability before a court imposes civil penalties.  Where 
needed, state legislatures should amend UDAP laws to limit civil 
penalties to instances in which a court finds that a business willfully 
engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice. 
In addition, when a court is assessing penalties, an AG should be 
required to produce evidence of actual consumer harm.  Actual harm is 
generally an indispensable part of all civil actions seeking damages or 
penalties, but the element of consumer harm is missing from some AG 
UDAP actions.  Where an AG is only able to establish that the unfair or 
deceptive conduct is reasonably likely to harm consumers, but has not 
caused actual harm, the action should be subject to an injunction to stop 
the practice and a lower, if any, civil penalty.  For example, a state that 
ordinarily provides for a civil penalty of $10,000 per violation might 
provide that a prohibited practice that did not result in significant harm to 
                                                          
 334.   For example, several courts have found insurance practices fall outside the scope of a 
UDAP statute that does not include a regulatory compliance exemption or specifically exclude such 
practices.  See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 584, 619 (D. 
N.J. 1996); Wilder v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309, 310 (Vt. 1981). 
 335.   See, e.g., White v. Wyeth, 705 S.E.2d 828, 838 (W. Va. 2010); see also Schwartz, 
Silverman & Appel, supra note 95 at 105–07 (citing cases in Georgia, Maine, and Rhode Island 
interpreting their UDAP laws in this manner). 
 336.   See State ex rel. McGraw v. Johnson & Johnson, 704 S.E.2d 677, 689–91 (W. Va. 2010). 
 337.   See Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. State, 432 S.W.3d 563, 579–80 (Ark. 2014). 
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the public is subject to an injunction and a civil penalty not to exceed 
$1,000 per violation, but no more than $1 million for any related series 
of violations. 
In order to alleviate some of the arbitrariness of how civil penalties 
can be calculated, UDAP laws should provide courts with factors to 
guide them in determining a fair and reasonable civil penalty.  Although 
statutory factors are common in laws authorizing civil penalties,338 few 
UDAP laws include them.339  Where a statute or regulation does not 
provide such guidance, courts can develop and consider penalty 
factors.340  For example, a state law might provide that when determining 
                                                          
 338.   For example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) considers: 
(1) the nature of the defect or noncompliance; (2) knowledge by the person charged of its 
obligations under this chapter; (3) the severity of the risk of injury; (4) the occurrence or 
absence of injury; (5) the number of motor vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment 
distributed with the defect or noncompliance; (6) actions taken by the person charged to 
identify, investigate, or mitigate the condition; (7) the appropriateness of such penalty in 
relation to the size of the business of the person charged, including the potential for 
undue adverse economic impacts; (8) whether the person has been assessed civil penalties 
under this section during the most recent 5 years; and (9) other appropriate factors. 
See 49 U.S.C. § 30165(c).  The Consumer Product Safety Administration (CPSC) considers: 
(A) The nature of the product defect; (B) The severity of the risk of injury; (C) The 
occurrence or absence of injury; (D) The number of defective products distributed; (E) 
The appropriateness of such penalty in relation to the size of the business of the person 
charged, including how to mitigate undue adverse economic impacts on small businesses; 
and (F) Such other factors as appropriate. 
See 16 C.F.R. § 1119.4 (2016). 
 339.   An example of a state UDAP law that includes penalty factors is the North Carolina Unfair 
and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.  It provides that 
[i]n determining the amount of the civil penalty, the court shall consider all relevant 
circumstances, including, but not limited to, the extent of the harm caused by the conduct 
constituting a violation, the nature and persistence of such conduct, the length of time 
over which the conduct occurred, the assets, liabilities, and net worth of the person, 
whether corporate or individual, and any corrective action taken by the defendant. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-15.2 (West 2012).  California’s Unfair Competition Law similarly 
provides that a court may consider: “the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the number of 
violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the misconduct occurred, 
the willfulness of the defendant’s misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth.” 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206(b) (West 2008 & Supp. 2014).  In Texas, the jury (not the court) 
decides whether to award a civil penalty and the amount.  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47(c) 
(West 2011).  In awarding a civil penalty, Texas’s deceptive trade practices law instructs the trier of 
fact to consider: 
(1) the seriousness of the violation, including the nature, circumstances, extent, and 
gravity of any prohibited act or practice; (2) the history of previous violations; (3) the 
amount necessary to deter future violations; (4) the economic effect on the person against 
whom the penalty is to be assessed; (5) knowledge of the illegality of the act or practice; 
and (6) any other matter that justice may require. 
Id. § 17.47(g). 
 340.   State ex rel. Wilson v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 777 S.E.2d 176, 203 n.31 (S.C. 
2015); see also United States v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 662 F.2d 955, 967 (3d Cir. 1981) (in 
determining civil penalty under FTC Act, considering “(1) the good or bad faith of the defendants; 
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the size of an appropriate civil penalty, a court would consider such 
factors as: (1) the degree of culpability and good or bad faith; (2) the 
actual impact or injury to the public resulting from the conduct; (3) the 
sophistication or level of knowledge of the parties; (4) the duration of the 
unlawful conduct; (5) any corrective action taken; (6) whether the person 
actively concealed the unlawful conduct; (7) whether the person engaged 
in prior similar conduct; (8) the deterrent value of the penalty; (9) any 
other liability imposed as a result of the same course of conduct; and (10) 
the potential for undue adverse economic impacts.  Adopting such 
factors is not a guarantee that courts will apply them appropriately and 
consistently, but would be a step forward.341 
Finally, due to the potential multiplying effect on a single action due 
to the vagueness of “per violation,” UDAP laws should place an 
aggregate limit on civil penalties, such as $5 million for “any related 
series of violations.”  Federal laws providing for civil penalties include 
such maximum levels.342  Alternatively, UDAP laws could provide a cap 
linked to the actual harm to consumers or profit received by the business 
as a result of the violation.  For example, a state law might provide that 
for any related series of violations, a civil penalty shall not exceed the 
greater of: (1) three times the actual loss caused by the violation; (2) 
three times the profit gained as a result of the violation; or (3) $5 
million.343 
                                                          
(2) the injury to the public; (3) the defendant’s ability to pay; (4) the desire to eliminate the benefits 
derived by a violation; and (5) the necessity of vindicating the authority of the FTC”); 
Commonwealth v. Fall River Motor Sales, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1205, 1211 (Mass. 1991) (applying 
same FTC factors to affirm $20,000 civil penalty under Massachusetts consumer protection law); 
State ex rel. Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 897 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) 
(applying first four factors to affirm $70,000 civil penalty under Minnesota consumer protection 
statutes). 
 341.   See, e.g., Joseph P. Mohorovic, Comm’r, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Statement 
Regarding the Commission’s Provisional Civil Penalty Settlement with Sunbeam Products, Inc. 




Solutions/ (calling for more clarity and transparency in the CPSC’s application of penalty factors to 
reach a civil fine amount). 
 342.   For example, the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2069(a)(1) (2012), includes a 
$15 million cap on civil penalties “for any related series of violations.”  Statutes administered by the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) also include aggregate civil penalty caps 
“for a related series of violations” or “for a related series of daily violations” ranging from $1 
million to $35 million depending on the type of violation at issue.  See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30165(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(B), (a)(3), (a)(4) (2012). 
 343.   There is a long history of use of treble damages as an appropriate level of punishment in 
UDAP and other laws.  See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507 (2008). 
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D. Ensure Settlement Money Furthers Consumer and Taxpayer Interests 
There are several options for addressing the questionable use of 
money received as a result of UDAP settlements and judgments by state 
officials.  Three main approaches are increasing transparency regarding 
the use of recovered funds, restricting the AG’s discretion in spending or 
allocating recovered funds, and requiring the AG to turn over the funds 
to the state legislature. 
Some state laws specifically provide that civil penalties, or, more 
broadly, money recovered from UDAP settlements and judgments must 
be deposited in the state’s general fund.344  Once deposited in the general 
fund, such funds are allocated through the ordinary legislative 
appropriation process.  In order to allow the AG to retain some control 
over their budget, states wishing to adopt this approach might also 
consider adding a provision that provides that before depositing the 
money in the general fund, the AG is authorized to use the recovered 
funds to reimburse documented, reasonable litigation expenses 
associated with the UDAP action, including expert witness fees, copying 
of documents, and transcripts.  This approach ensures that taxpayers 
receive the full benefit of any recovery.  Several state legislatures have 
considered, but not yet enacted, reforms along these lines.345 
A potentially more politically feasible approach is to establish a 
consumer protection fund and permit the AG to retain a portion of UDAP 
settlements and judgments and use them exclusively for the office’s 
consumer education and enforcement activities.  In order to limit the 
AG’s control over the recovered funds, some states subject the fund to 
annual legislative appropriation.346  The money in these funds may carry 
over from one fiscal year to the next.347  A few states place a cap on the 
                                                          
 344.   See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.2075 (West 2010) (civil penalties); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 48.005(2)(a), (4) (West Supp. 2013) (funds or assets); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-206(C) (West 
2011) (civil penalties). 
 345.   See, e.g., LD 1414, 127th Me. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2015), 
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/display_ps.asp?ld=1414&PID=1456&snum=127; H.B. 
4799, Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(zoiu5y3vdvkcpeg4ppfejlmd))/ 
mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=2009-HB-4799. 
 346.   See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1531.01(A) (2013 & Supp. 2015); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 48-606(5) (West 2006); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:259 (2006) (providing that all 
proceeds recovered by the AG on behalf of the state, including settlements and civil penalties, must 
be deposited in a special fund in the state treasury, which is annually appropriated to the Department 
of Justice solely for certain litigation costs). 
 347.   See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1531.01(A) (2013 & Supp. 2015); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21a-8a(a) (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2527(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-133 (West 2012). 
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maximum balance of the fund, after which any additional funds go to the 
state’s general fund348 or divide recovery between the general fund and a 
consumer protection fund.349  New Hampshire adopted this approach in 
2015, when it provided that all funds recovered by the AG in a consumer 
protection action must be deposited in the state’s consumer protection 
escrow account and that any amount over $5,000,000 must be deposited 
into the state’s general fund.350 
This approach may be a good fit in states that already have such a 
fund in place to assist in financing the AG’s consumer protection efforts 
and ensure that settlement money is not spent on unrelated activities.351  
By placing a cap on the fund and requiring any excess funds to be 
deposited into the general fund, the legislature maintains control over 
most of the recovered funds while providing the AG a limited amount it 
can use at its discretion.  The cap also ensures that taxpayers share the 
benefit when a state enters in an extraordinary settlement or judgment 
and that large sums are not withheld from the legislative appropriation. 
States have also attempted to address the concern over the use of 
recovered funds by increasing transparency as to the disposition of 
UDAP enforcement actions.  Arizona and Arkansas, for example, have 
required the AG to provide a quarterly or annual report to the legislature 
that includes, for each settlement or judgment, the aggregate recovery, 
the value of restitution to a state agency or consumers, amounts 
recovered for civil penalties, amounts recovered for attorney fees, the 
AG’s use or planned use of the amounts received, and the balance of the 
AG’s fund.352 
Arkansas recently instituted a package of reforms that increased 
transparency and placed bounds on the AG’s allocation of settlement 
funds.  After controversy over the AG’s spending of settlement money to 
build a police training facility in 2011, the office of the Arkansas AG 
                                                          
 348.   See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2527(c) (West Supp. 2016) ($3,000,000 limit in any 
fiscal year after which the excess is deposited in the General Fund). 
 349.   See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-19(1)(b) (West 1999) (AG may receive one-half of 
civil penalties upon petition to court, payable into AG’s special fund). 
 350.   N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:6-f (Supp. 2015). 
 351.   See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1531.01 (2013 & Supp. 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21a-8a (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2527 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-133 (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.51 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); W. Va. 
Consumer Protection Recovery Fund (Special Revenue Account, Fund 1509); see also NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 598.0975(1)(a) (West 2014) (requiring deposit of recovery into state general fund for 
use in enforcing consumer protection law). 
 352.   ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-105(f)(2) (West Supp. 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1531.01(D) (2013 & Supp. 2015); see also H.B. 4799, Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009) (including quarterly 
report requirement). 
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announced a new internal policy on lawsuit settlement funds.353  The 
state legislature codified this reform in 2013.354  The statute provides that 
whenever the state receives a portion of a settlement or judgment from an 
action to which the state is a party, the AG must distribute the money in 
the following manner: (1) payment to the Arkansas consumers or state 
agencies designed by a court order or settlement agreement; (2) payment 
to a state agency having a nexus to the underlying litigation; (3) payment 
of attorney’s fees to the State Treasury; or (4) payment into the AG’s 
“Consumer Education and Enforcement Account,” which is exclusively 
used for specified consumer litigation and education related expenses.355  
The Arkansas law also caps the enforcement account at $1 million and 
requires the AG to provide quarterly financial reports to the Legislative 
Council.356 
In states in which the AG controls recovered funds, legislatures 
should consider precluding allocation of state recovery from UDAP 
settlements and judgments to outside organizations.357  This step would 
eliminate the concerns that arise when state AGs and other officials give 
money recovered as a result of litigation to politically popular projects 
and handpicked organizations.  If an AG is authorized to distribute funds 
from UDAP settlements and judgments, then, at minimum, he or she 
should be limited to providing money to state agencies for activities that 
have a close nexus to the underlying litigation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The problematic enforcement practices discussed in this Article cut 
across the states.  They are not limited to AGs in any particular political 
party.  These types of actions are becoming more commonplace.  Private 
                                                          
 353.   See Ark. Office of the Att’y Gen., AG Policy on Lawsuit Settlement Funds (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://www.thearkansasproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/0752_001.pdf. 
 354.   2013 Ark. Acts 763 (H.B. 2083) (amending ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-105(e) and adding 
(f)). 
 355.   ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-105(e)(3)(B), (f)(2) (West Supp. 2014). 
 356.   Id. § 4-88-105(e)(3)(B), (f)(4). 
 357.   The U.S. Department of Justice adopted a policy in 2008 that generally prohibits 
settlements that require a criminal defendant “to pay funds to a charitable, educational, community, 
or other organization or individual that is not a victim of the criminal activity or is not providing 
services to redress the harm caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct.” OFFICES OF THE U.S. 
ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-16.325 Plea Agreements, 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Non-Prosecution Agreements and “Extraordinary Restitution” 
(Feb. 2010), https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-16000-pleas-federal-rule-criminal-procedure-
11#9-16.325.  This policy, however, does not extend to civil settlements.  Legislation pending before 
Congress would preclude the federal government from entering any settlement agreement in a civil 
action that requires a donation to any party.  H.R. 5063, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016). 
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law firms that specialize in representing AGs and other government 
bodies, or that focus on bringing similar private litigation, are 
emboldened by multi-million dollar recoveries in UDAP actions and 
identifying new targets.  Despite the controversy that can ensue, many 
AGs appear open to this type of litigation.  That is not surprising 
because, under current law in many states, contracting out law 
enforcement authority is low-risk and low-cost, can lead to headline 
grabbing settlements and judgments against unpopular industries, and 
can result in an influx of funds that AGs can allocate at their discretion. 
These types of actions, however, are not what policymakers 
envisioned when enacting UDAP laws.  Rather than protect consumers 
harmed by deceptive business practices, these outlier enforcement 
actions primarily benefit the private lawyers who bring them and the 
AGs who hire those lawyers.  Instead of filling gaps where consumer 
protection is needed, they often target practices already closely regulated 
by agencies charged with protecting the public.  Some simply pile on 
fines for concerns that regulators considered fully resolved. 
AGs can fully protect consumers from unfair or deceptive business 
practices without sponsoring litigation that seeks unwarranted or 
excessive civil penalties, interferes with the expertise of agencies that 
regulate certain areas, or intrudes on the power of legislators to 
appropriate funds.  State legislatures and courts should address 
overreach.  A combination of modest legislative reforms, principled 
judicial interpretation of UDAP laws, increased transparency, and closer 
protection of due process rights can keep UDAP enforcement on track.  
Such measures can ensure that UDAP actions respond to a public need, 
civil penalties reflect the conduct at issue, and settlement funds serve 
consumers and the public interest. 
